Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 8a309b62d7319624…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

899.2 KB
MD5: 316751bdb6439a13df5d7153e0348d5a SHA-1: 4ce31487ca398ee16e3a500be9599724b669af0f SHA-256: 8a309b62d7319624bb969198a1e892b8b943a215ac32cda6f2ae48122b23d910
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 Malicious Link T1204.002 Malicious Link: Malicious File T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter T1059.005 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Visual Basic

The RTF document contains OLE object data and is configured to automatically update and activate OLE objects, indicating it's designed to execute embedded content. The document body includes a lure instructing the user to 'click Enable editing', a common tactic for macro-based malware delivery. The presence of OLE object data suggests the potential for embedded exploits or malicious scripts, although no specific script content was extracted. The overall goal appears to be tricking the user into enabling content that will likely download and execute a second-stage payload.

Heuristics 4

  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off0002a532.bin
c5e9a4bb55a57b840ff9bebfa978fb95de16980fafbe4c99d0316c4b39e1bee8
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x2A532 4253 bytes