Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 8a1c9a28ba0c74ba…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

93.5 KB Created: 2021-01-01 11:12:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000 First seen: 2022-06-07
MD5: c9f8addb927c3b96aee6a9f671a1f801 SHA-1: a74f9baa1791476c489942dd9e24c8c6fd0822cd SHA-256: 8a1c9a28ba0c74bafd71705aa12128831d66bbae06536a81d680cd207e740a65
142 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample is an OOXML document that leverages vulnerabilities CVE-2017-8759 and CVE-2023-36884. These vulnerabilities are related to the loading of external OLE objects, specifically an RTF file hosted at HtTps://nima.ppra.live/5133/1/3272/2/0/0/0/m/files-41b31573/file.rtf. This indicates the document is designed to download and execute a secondary payload. The document body content appears to be benign administrative text, suggesting the malicious functionality is entirely driven by the embedded exploit and external resource.

Heuristics 4

  • CVE-2023-36884 — external RTF auto-load relationship critical CVE likely CVE_2023_36884
    Document auto-load relationship references a remote RTF file (HtTps://nima.ppra.live/5133/1/3272/2/0/0/0/m/files-41b31573/file.rtf), matching the stronger Storm-0978/RomCom external-RTF delivery shape. Plain clickable hyperlinks are not enough for this CVE rule.
  • OOXML OLE2Link remote document — CVE-2017-8759 related high CVE related CVE_2017_8759_RELATED
    Document contains an o:OLEObject Type=Link whose external oleObject relationship fetches a remote Office-looking document. That is the OOXML OLE2Link staging shape used by CVE-2017-8759 campaigns when the remote document/WSDL supplies the SOAP moniker payload; the local file alone does not contain the WSDL body needed for an exact match.
  • External OLE object relationship high OOXML_EXTERNAL_OLE_OBJECT
    Document contains an oleObject relationship whose target is an external HTTP(S) URL. Office resolves this through OLE/object update paths rather than as a normal user-clicked hyperlink.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartex
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officedocument/2006/relationships/oleobject

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
emf_00.emf
1833637d2bb49186e0667ae0896ecc4d5b00b3383529f74edb75cad8748cd9b3		 ooxml-emf OOXML EMF part: word/media/image1.emf 52 bytes

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