Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 8a1a43b49b5645fc…

MALICIOUS

PDF

119.4 KB Created: 2021-07-26 01:56:07 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2021-10-12
MD5: b9f7d99be33922822072d4726005d646 SHA-1: f4adcce8f4dadf6f344457bc7e5a7143915d60e0 SHA-256: 8a1a43b49b5645fcf52c7132ce53992415ec95f6bbb958d0b9b746abb5183ef3
176 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The PDF contains numerous external links, with several pointing to potentially compromised CMS upload directories and disposable hosting. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly indicate malicious intent. While no scripts were explicitly extracted, the PDF structure and embedded URIs suggest it's designed to redirect users to malicious sites, likely as part of a phishing or malware delivery chain.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9990

Heuristics 7

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Clickable URI points to raw IP address medium PDF_URI_IP_LITERAL
    PDF contains a clickable HTTP(S) action whose host is a literal IPv4 address. Legitimate documents normally link to named domains; raw-IP destinations are common in disposable phishing and malware-delivery infrastructure.
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://italiangreyhound.pl/img1/userfiles/file/toxamadipene.pdf In PDF document text
    • http://billedbutikken.dk/articlefiles/file/44839566529.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://abwessex.com/uploads/files/nunabuki.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://kindervakantieweekdeurne.nl/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160923b8d51015---79639864332.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.grupohk.com.br/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160c3039643207---72420463577.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://whitelightdesign.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/6fab7749a405ea883a39c3d855ff372e/kitefabovijebenivowenasor.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.danvillern.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/6ilcbanib7p8vufhgf2r79n1c7/suzoxid.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.jimenez-casquet.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1608a9cd93f594---bubonubi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://famillespourstarlight.ca/clients/a/a9/a9b42c05011d3bb27e7f7ec2ed30324f/File/jarodulodilogolonebajemet.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://travelselection.us/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1606d50078c4f2---kifutupufuwukexo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://morethancars.nl/uploads/edytor/file/85209230367.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.radiopopiatej.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160786f2773ffa---58221630362.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://talaa-obour.com/webmisr/uploadwebmisr/file/74850361166.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.socalgreatwhite.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16095d64d6af01---dajalikivek.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://178.62.148.222:300/ckeditor/ckfinder/userfiles/files/65437353474.pdfPDF link annotation
    • http://eventclub.pl/userfiles/file/85526140280.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.cargeacrew.com.br/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16084172f1b60e---52539737202.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://tunglamgarden.com/images/fck/file/7903923640.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://rhagro.com.mx/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/a86b986800062274c735c82833d140bc/voxopekunarojojut.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://school19-zav.ru/userfiles/file/xejorejamer.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.oknookna.pl/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16098fe28bfb93---jefimetumebidimo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://toanthinh.vn/webroot/img/files/jazekuna.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://andlupa.com/userfiles/file/pisubu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/skout/mBVl/~3/BvfzZFkJO3s/uplcv?utm_term=do+the+baudelaires+have+a+happy+endingPDF link annotation
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00016f76.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x16F76 11092 bytes
SHA-256: 4305e9c471600aeb6df566f5c973f45f5de2dd60236b40bfa7d2dbde770ed6fb
font_01_sfnt_off000188db.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x188DB 17964 bytes
SHA-256: a9ee550a4008e457bae05673257f560bff3f382f9a696a2e9d17d9419d3782cf
font_02_sfnt_off0001b77c.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1B77C 16792 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1

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