Malicious Office (OOXML) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 89df99036fa243e8…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML)

572.0 KB Created: 2018-09-10 20:35:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 14.0000 First seen: 2020-09-07
MD5: 8e4aa7c4adec20a48fe4127f3cf2656d SHA-1: ca066decc8567fc580420e3219b5d3536e669b4b SHA-256: 89df99036fa243e882a11796e9650c52dea6332c7a6cfa9fd04b0efddd92cba6
102 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The sample is an OOXML document containing an embedded OLE object with executable indicators, strongly suggesting exploitation of CVE-2026-21514. The document body contains a lure instructing the user to 'Enable Editing' and 'Run' an icon, which is a common tactic to bypass macro security. The embedded OLE object is likely a second-stage payload.

Heuristics 4

  • Ole10Native package drops an auto-executable payload critical OFFICE_PACKAGE_RISKY_FILE
    OLE Package displayName or fullPath ends in a directly auto-executable extension (a runnable binary or a script the default shell host runs on double-click). Embedding such a payload inside an Office document has no benign authoring use — it is a malware-delivery dropper.
  • Embedded OLE object medium OOXML_OLE_OBJECT
    Document contains an embedded OLE object
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006In document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationshipsIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/mathIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawingIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/mainIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroupIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInkIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordmlIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShapeIn document text (OOXML body / shared strings)

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
ooxml_oleobject_00.bin ooxml-ole-object OOXML embedded OLE part: word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin 964608 bytes
SHA-256: d757c7392c5b9691bffb841f070dabc8e12dc5006c7aeee3d5a41f313f05736b
ooxml_oleobject_00_ole10native_00.bin ole-package OOXML word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin Ole10Native stream: Ole10Native 954280 bytes
SHA-256: ace11509f56766b4c3a77561c7e4e7295d680131b073cc7f517027945259c529
emf_00.emf ooxml-emf OOXML EMF part: word/media/image2.emf 5188 bytes
SHA-256: 3113003b389047bd947893825ce00df587979c8da2ac9952454809bcdfd11d0d

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