RTF malware analysis — malicious · 89df6431a70827ce

MALICIOUS

RTF

80.0 KB First seen: 2024-09-12

MD5: eceaf68e766e67119c7ae2af631ee6a3 SHA-1: acb971111193cdb0c70308e359e8ea3e6b7c3d40 SHA-256: 89df6431a70827ce43a3f4a9aab480d6857d9f4a61d0cf649c0df03f7f60324f

120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample is an RTF document that contains OLE object data and specifically triggers the Equation Editor vulnerability. The \objupdate directive indicates that the embedded OLE object is intended to be activated automatically, which is a common technique for exploiting vulnerabilities like the one in Equation Editor. This exploit likely serves to download and execute a secondary payload.

Heuristics 3

Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off00000766.bin` `34271ad13db04f7e055f9d99e19a269989f89c954bdbc8d16d33aaa8b0ab9e0a`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x766	1654 bytes

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