Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 89d46f15e52f3ad2…

MALICIOUS

PDF

65.5 KB Created: 2020-11-01 08:57:52 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-05-15
MD5: dd7c22ee15a5cdea08fbf8cf148dd371 SHA-1: 6b9b6545bac4d518193fa694d19ff846c96988a7 SHA-256: 89d46f15e52f3ad22c8d1e4a6a4d2de1aae657b4a2ba377784966e58edbdeac2
194 Risk Score

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Image lure linking to an SEO redirector (free-download phishing) high PDF_SEO_UTM_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF embeds an image with little or no body text and a clickable link to a multi-word utm_term / FeedBurner-proxied SEO redirector — the 'free ebook / solution-manual / document download' phishing family that ranks for natural-language search queries and routes the user into a payload/redirect chain. The PDF carries no exploit; the risk is the linked destination. Flagged structurally (image lure + SEO redirector) so it does not depend on a ClamAV/ML signature, and regardless of how many filler text pages the lure carries.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://gettraff.ru/aws?keyword=dr+jennifer+daniels+vimeo In PDF document text
    • https://bizumoku.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/6/132681494/1352259.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://dimaxafazeza.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131453031/zakeme.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://zeburunonuf.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134458398/78513c542ea.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://jikolugoxolij.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131379047/67c5391dd100.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://bewapuvin.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131453684/koluperuziwifuwoda.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://www.daltonmaag.com/In PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/422f3f71-4ddb-40b8-9e15-3a911608f179/muvewovelesizitilarejo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0498/0044/6113/files/fox_13_channel_guide.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0499/5068/7387/files/feradekuxosawutafa.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/c4ae2479-91ff-4856-bcf0-150c27fea6b1/rixokamejipewovadu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/2066024f-bb06-4d25-aef5-c8e9034260a1/49771325142.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/7be438b3-e0e7-4ae8-99a7-c72cffe7d1af/42853207194.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/20d94591-2782-4faf-b28c-29801f2fd75f/bakepodetoverixizobapali.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/6f96ace2-a7a7-4fe0-835a-7133fdbcf69c/48632427716.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/b9d0ad2e-c304-4b60-aaac-2eacc4910a25/97967154998.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/32993286-1575-4d6e-83fa-717bfadfd703/77809333083.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000b482.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xB482 4896 bytes
SHA-256: c4bbad331b77de523ff7237ec99fc02f5960e918c531914c6f86905cbd09860c
font_01_sfnt_off0000c511.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xC511 11116 bytes
SHA-256: b4ade9c97f9a5bf77cb2b55e454402bf33b2461387d4d88d1f97725e7bee380d
font_02_sfnt_off0000ea73.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xEA73 4324 bytes
SHA-256: ff5f0ef16caf3e97cd1984b3a03ea88e11eab8cf63d2ee006085a4b9995833f3

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