Malicious Office (OLE) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 89c782f96bca549e…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .DOC

769.0 KB First seen: 2026-05-11
MD5: 02e63a7d2d76ff928c9ebc0bb1f82f15 SHA-1: caba456453903b8b8442bf862fe008811e51ed90 SHA-256: 89c782f96bca549ee931afb89a7282cd0b56781fb2726a5182769b66e7491c38
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample is a password-encrypted Office document that contains an Equation Editor OLE object, a known exploit carrier. This suggests the document is designed to exploit a vulnerability, likely via a spearphishing attachment, to execute a payload. No specific family could be identified due to the lack of extractable content and scripts.

Heuristics 4

  • Equation Editor OLE object high CVE related OLE_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Default-encrypted OOXML embedded OLE object xl/embeddings/oleObject1.bin contains the Equation Editor CLSID, the legacy component exploited by CVE-2017-11882, CVE-2018-0802, and CVE-2018-0798.
  • Default-encrypted OOXML exploit carrier layout high OOXML_ENCRYPTED_EXPLOIT_CARRIER_SHAPE
    Default-password encrypted OOXML package contains embedded OLE object parts and additional activation/decoy parts. This layout is common in malicious Excel exploit delivery and requires inspecting the decrypted package.
  • Office document is password-encrypted medium OFFICE_ENCRYPTED_PACKAGE
    OLE container holds MS-OFFCRYPTO encrypted package (Standard Encryption (Office 2007+, AES-128)).
  • Office OOXML encrypted with default VelvetSweatshop password medium OFFICE_DEFAULT_PASSWORD_ENCRYPTED_OOXML
    OLE EncryptedPackage decrypts with Excel's built-in VelvetSweatshop password. Office opens this transparently, and malware uses it to hide OOXML exploit parts from scanners that only inspect the outer OLE container.