Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 89a7894683cf44b2…

MALICIOUS

PDF

86.3 KB Created: 2021-07-14 04:33:27 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2021-09-13
MD5: 01d2667fefae767fe0bb01e3be86943d SHA-1: 70ac62f76305068aeb11af7ab8ad79c611c238a2 SHA-256: 89a7894683cf44b2524df1dd29fee321098034d7b091750ee856258118d23b38
172 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The PDF contains embedded JavaScript and a link farm pointing to multiple compromised WordPress sites, which in turn host other PDF files. This suggests a multi-stage attack, likely initiated via spearphishing, where the initial PDF serves as a lure to download further malicious content. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly indicate malicious intent.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9944

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Urgency / deadline lure low SE_URGENCY_LURE
    Document contains urgency or deadline language ('account will be terminated', 'action required within 24 hours', etc.) — useful context, but low-signal without other findings
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://call.ae/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160a97ad871d05---sisikebapagiba.pdf In PDF document text
    • http://kme-kme.cz/files/file/36709507989.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://tocgia247.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/bmfe9ocjcoqk53l05d0chmgsmb/8229180233.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://masterok-kovka.ru/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/5c7456ecd463e20919c5665e0f117a4c/75461339342.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://psychologkmalinowska.pl/ckfinder/userfiles/files/vokuxi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.marvistasales.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/9eca833695da75c4f8204112e51561df/97079324628.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://sfasg.jp/js/ckfinder/userfiles/files/sojokubedulikakuru.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://shriayurvednagpur.org/public/ckfinder/userfiles/files/33047414116.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://mps-india.com/userfiles/files/15698642940.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://qhs1978.com/clients/d/dd/dd8db5a278a7ad55a2ada34b8e38ebcc/File/76341209750.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://onishi-kyosendo.jp/archive/zidafad.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://alnadaoil.com/userfiles/file/medololisosodulozet.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.alexgis.com/siteuploads/editorimg/file/30889210088.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://english-life.ru/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16070ab9cb8263---74604061120.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cutletsmeat.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1607a407c0ff3c---14807840907.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://refundsrefunds.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160b782c85d350---jikesobusane.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://vmkmsz.hu/userfiles/file/66315588775.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://eprdel.cz/userfiles/file/fakotutukemupamobadabizis.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.davidwoodpersonnel.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16071d29a03974---kodemigenepag.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://by-express.com/upfiles/editor/files/2211042623.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://synersys.fr/contenu/file/50135570489.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://mytopics.it/uploads/file/48198002043.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/skout/mBVl/~3/S30rS-6n6vg/uplcv?utm_term=snaptube+video+pour+androidPDF link annotation
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 4

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000e53b.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE53B 10552 bytes
SHA-256: 9f78acb623d8fe4fc8f22b53c24628062842cb10cbf4a59c487adb051f993e20
font_01_sfnt_off0000fd29.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xFD29 1672 bytes
SHA-256: 3f1748778f03e7b7e2d3a6c88ca15ef060a02f224cd71155e662fde9dd4c56c7
font_02_sfnt_off00010517.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x10517 18580 bytes
SHA-256: e20961ebf8d25bb59d77e92b8a9f563393d36e255ac73a05ae6e47fe1c80baa4
font_03_sfnt_off00013404.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x13404 16792 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1

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