Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 899f6a0fde2cfbeb…

MALICIOUS

PDF

63.4 KB
MD5: e17ff3afa4c4b06302fd5e653d663a1e SHA-1: 4ab2cc3df3c03b169a18805e4a437c91aa4674da SHA-256: 899f6a0fde2cfbebf7235395c82d36130026e85015f8c99a71e3383a8e04cb53
138 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.001 PowerShell T1204 User Execution

The PDF file contains an embedded script payload and triggers the CVE-2010-0188 exploit for Adobe Reader. This exploit is known to be used for arbitrary code execution, typically to download and run additional malware. No specific family could be identified, but the exploit vector is clear.

Heuristics 6

  • Adobe Reader LibTIFF XFA image exploit — CVE-2010-0188 critical CVE likely CVE_2010_0188
    PDF contains the CVE-2010-0188 exploit template: XFA JavaScript heap-spray setup, a generated TIFF image payload, and assignment of that TIFF data to an XFA image field rawValue to trigger Adobe Reader's LibTIFF parser.
  • XFA form contains executable script high CVE related PDF_XFA_SCRIPT
    PDF embeds an XFA form whose dataset contains a <script> or <xfa:script> block — XFA scripting has been the exploit primitive for several Adobe Reader RCEs (CVE-2010-0188 family, CVE-2018-4901, and others). Plain XFA without scripts is far less risky.
  • Embedded script payload in PDF stream medium PDF_EMBEDDED_SCRIPT_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an HTML/XFA <script> tag without accompanying Windows shell-execution primitives — common in accessible XFA forms but worth surfacing for analyst review.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • XFA form low PDF_XFA
    PDF uses XML Forms Architecture — can contain script logic
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://ns.adobe.com/xdp/
    • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-template/2.5/
    • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-data/1.0/

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
embedded_file_obj0008.bin
2dd25f8789da20fad0fe44fb30ed73815581c1415ec3a0676ab9052cb583752d
pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 8 at offset 0xC6 64187 bytes