Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 8999ed496fea2cca…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

1003.9 KB Created: 2019-12-20 17:39:00
MD5: 0a7e119be75a3f777d38f0c7023faed9 SHA-1: 7e6f02c100e9733c3da35bce1d26d680f23b3e18 SHA-256: 8999ed496fea2ccadec059acdc62e783aa549c93f301f6fc175d15ecdc2fbb81
160 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.001 User Execution: Malicious Link T1059.001 PowerShell T1204.002 User Execution: Malicious File

The file is an RTF document containing embedded OLE objects, with critical heuristics indicating exploitation of CVE-2017-8759. This vulnerability allows for OLE activation, which is likely used to trigger the embedded object. The presence of an embedded URL, though not fully resolved, further suggests a download or redirection mechanism. The overall pattern points to a malicious document designed to exploit a known vulnerability for payload delivery.

Heuristics 6

  • CVE-2017-8759 — MSXML SAX OLE activation critical CVE likely CVE_2017_8759
    RTF contains a hex-encoded OLE1 object for Msxml2.SAXXMLReader.6.0 followed by an embedded OLE compound document, and the document requests OLE activation. This matches the RTF staging shape used for CVE-2017-8759 SOAP/WSDL parser code injection.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • OlePres presentation stream in RTF OLE object medium RTF_OLEPRES_STREAM
    RTF contains an embedded OLE object with an OlePres presentation stream. OlePres is an OLE presentation marker and is not enough on its own to identify CVE-2025-21298.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.c

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00076cf7.bin
73c8a744bf31e5e52459aa6bea830e84980324a2e8126dae1b636bb3e3c4e7cf
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x76CF7 121902 bytes