Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 8992e9e448943afa…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

4.7 KB
MD5: feaf04b9118607cb4032bad396ad4c44 SHA-1: 2656c09c4a0ff301f33540193ab1b858da2e4e3e SHA-256: 8992e9e448943afa0f930a90dafd30a9b859972eae160f10fd94afccb28e1501
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The RTF document contains embedded OLE object data, specifically triggering the Equation Editor vulnerability. The \objupdate directive forces OLE activation, indicating an attempt to exploit this vulnerability for arbitrary code execution. This is a common delivery mechanism for various malware families.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off0000008b.bin
07bfddad82ea962d63c366dd6f7adff0452e251ef39b74a7dbfcefd84a670322
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x8B 2129 bytes