Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLSX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 898ae9eaa1fc9515…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLSX

194.0 KB
MD5: f7664ceb1ae46d88b26cd319ccb86d28 SHA-1: 0d2aac0a1d9745f2725247501dd9f88c64387ca6 SHA-256: 898ae9eaa1fc95153d3c01e02b7f1d2561ddf03b467d568e6850b328e3f3a161
142 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.001 PowerShell

The sample is a password-encrypted Office document that exploits CVE-2017-0199. The exploit carrier is an embedded OLE object that attempts to download a remote document from 'http://irequestyoutopleaseadviseonthepayment.duckdns.org/invoice.doc'. The document body is not extractable due to encryption, but the exploit itself indicates a malicious intent to load external content.

Heuristics 5

  • OLE2Link / URL Moniker → remote loader — CVE-2017-0199 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_0199
    Document contains an embedded OLE link object whose URL Moniker points to a remote URL. When the host file is opened, Office follows the link, downloads the URL, and processes the response based on its Content-Type (HTA -> mshta.exe, RTF → Word, etc.) — the documented CVE-2017-0199 primitive. The URL extension is not a reliable filter; servers can return different payloads to Office's user agent.
  • Default-encrypted OOXML exploit carrier layout high OOXML_ENCRYPTED_EXPLOIT_CARRIER_SHAPE
    Default-password encrypted OOXML package contains embedded OLE object parts and additional activation/decoy parts. This layout is common in malicious Excel exploit delivery and requires inspecting the decrypted package.
  • Office document is password-encrypted medium OFFICE_ENCRYPTED_PACKAGE
    OLE container holds MS-OFFCRYPTO encrypted package (Standard Encryption (Office 2007+, AES-128)).
  • Office OOXML encrypted with default VelvetSweatshop password medium OFFICE_DEFAULT_PASSWORD_ENCRYPTED_OOXML
    OLE EncryptedPackage decrypts with Excel's built-in VelvetSweatshop password. Office opens this transparently, and malware uses it to hide OOXML exploit parts from scanners that only inspect the outer OLE container.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://irequestyoutopleaseadviseonthepayment.duckdns.org/invoice.doc

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