Hancitor — Office (OLE) / .DOC malware analysis

Static analysis result for SHA-256 89885adcbb030fd0…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .DOC

417.5 KB Created: 2021-10-27 09:37:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2021-11-02
MD5: ba23c4970aa9c2de50bdf1b1e33bbadc SHA-1: d51ee5f01cb47da056917564e8046cb41fc0e052 SHA-256: 89885adcbb030fd0251b08cc401392e90d4ad948f6cfc68dda34472c455a8951
164 Risk Score

Malware Insights

Hancitor · confidence 95%

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample is a malicious Office document containing a VBA macro that executes upon opening. The macro attempts to establish persistence by writing to the registry key HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\IAccessible2Proxy and then opens a password-protected document with the password 'doyouknowthatthegodsofdeathonlyeatapples?'. This behavior is characteristic of the Hancitor downloader family, which typically downloads and executes further malicious payloads.

Heuristics 6

  • Office EPRINT stream contains EMF object high CVE related OLE_EPRINT_EMF_OBJECT
    OLE ObjectPool contains an EPRINT stream with EMF data. This is rare in normal documents and is CVE-2007-3893/MS07-046-family evidence when paired with Office exploit payload anomalies, but the malformed EMF record is not proven by this rule alone.
  • ClamAV: Doc.Downloader.Hancitor10210-9903725-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Downloader.Hancitor10210-9903725-0
  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • VBA macros detected medium OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/2006/encryption
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/2006/keyEncryptor/password
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/2006/keyEncryptor/certificate
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
37de58c00a52d47dd59e72cd61525d79bd278210a5140c24b36f0e086486363f		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 3698 bytes
ole10native_00.bin
3c1d9005200bbcaee742d73318fa6bd933242608b23e5a35d1a092fd046d61f2		 ole-package OLE Ole10Native stream: ObjectPool/_1696807836/Ole10Native 235811 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact entropy is 7.97, consistent with packed or encrypted content.

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