Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 89776718e49718fe…

MALICIOUS

RTF

16.8 KB First seen: 2018-10-07
MD5: 94200ed0fea02a7de7ebc335f3f17179 SHA-1: 0383b5c25524ae8233517f1b16783d48886c000d SHA-256: 89776718e49718feb6b17f9a43ac88178eb741510b76e8ac17a8d7d641617874
200 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF file contains an OLE object that leverages the CVE-2017-11882 vulnerability in Microsoft Equation Editor. This vulnerability is commonly exploited to execute arbitrary code, likely to download and run a second-stage payload. The presence of the Ole10Native stream and objdata further confirms the exploitation attempt.

Heuristics 5

  • Equation Editor Ole10Native payload — CVE-2017-11882 likely critical CVE likely CVE_2017_11882_EQUATION_OLE10NATIVE
    RTF decodes to an activated Microsoft Equation 3.0 OLE storage whose payload is a high-entropy Ole10Native stream rather than normal Equation Native/MTEF data. This is a weaponized Equation Editor RCE delivery shape consistent with CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802.
  • Ole10Native stream in RTF OLE object high CVE related RTF_OLE10NATIVE_STREAM
    RTF contains an embedded OLE object with an Ole10Native stream. This is a strong payload-container signal and is related to Word/OLE exploit delivery, but it is not specific enough on its own to assign a CVE.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000cda.bin rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xCDA 4651 bytes
SHA-256: c5f466187fd3977c70f38038cc03f416f6bc7c04cc7c257e9a8c32cdcae6316a