Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 896963a49f16e9e2…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

978.5 KB Created: 2019-09-17 13:59:00
MD5: 1802d78a136fc9272ab68d349d489de0 SHA-1: 0d8c952dfa4d14c4c42cf9d6bf7e1cf36f99d860 SHA-256: 896963a49f16e9e23fa50fbd09738bba7ea519115e62a996afa7972e54b619fc
200 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 Malicious Link T1566 Phishing T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter

The file is an RTF document that contains an embedded OLE object, specifically targeting the Equation Editor. Critical heuristics indicate the exploitation of CVE-2017-8759, a known vulnerability related to MSXML SAX OLE activation. This suggests the document is designed to exploit this vulnerability to achieve code execution, likely as a first stage for a broader attack.

Heuristics 6

  • CVE-2017-8759 — MSXML SAX OLE activation critical CVE likely CVE_2017_8759
    RTF contains a hex-encoded OLE1 object for Msxml2.SAXXMLReader.6.0 followed by an embedded OLE compound document, and the document requests OLE activation. This matches the RTF staging shape used for CVE-2017-8759 SOAP/WSDL parser code injection.
  • Equation Editor CLSID critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Equation Editor OLE CLSID found inside an OLE object — exploited by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 / CVE-2018-0798
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2003/wordml

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000e6855.bin
6e78ccf6eddddcd8509ab09e567c1f3764fc45a73d8fce6836da2e2609d39e58		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xE6855 3732 bytes

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