MALICIOUS
262
Risk Score
Malware Insights
MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File
T1059.001 PowerShell
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment
T1204.001 Malicious Link
The sample leverages multiple CVEs (2017-0199, 2017-8759, 2023-36884) to load external content. Specifically, it uses OLE2Link objects to fetch and execute payloads from mediafire.com and catbox.moe. The MSHTML external object relationship points to an HTA file, indicating a likely execution chain designed to download and run a second-stage payload.
Heuristics 7
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CVE-2023-36884 — external RTF auto-load relationship critical CVE likely CVE_2023_36884Document auto-load relationship references a remote RTF file (https://www.mediafire.com/file/eamsi5gf1wrile2/Update.rtf), matching the stronger Storm-0978/RomCom external-RTF delivery shape. Plain clickable hyperlinks are not enough for this CVE rule.
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MSHTML-style external object relationship critical OFFICE_MSHTML_EXTERNAL_OBJECTExternal relationship to https://files.catbox.moe/lqc0er.hta — exploitable MSHTML/CAB/MHTML/HTA-style Office attack surface
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OOXML OLE2Link remote loader — CVE-2017-0199 related high CVE_2017_0199_RELATEDDocument contains an o:OLEObject Type=Link whose external oleObject relationship points to a remote URL. This is the OOXML OLE2Link activation shape associated with CVE-2017-0199 delivery, but the local file does not expose URL Moniker bytes or a weaponized extension/content type, so the exact CVE cannot be proven statically.
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OOXML OLE2Link remote document — CVE-2017-8759 related high CVE_2017_8759_RELATEDDocument contains an o:OLEObject Type=Link whose external oleObject relationship fetches a remote Office-looking document. That is the OOXML OLE2Link staging shape used by CVE-2017-8759 campaigns when the remote document/WSDL supplies the SOAP moniker payload; the local file alone does not contain the WSDL body needed for an exact match.
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External OLE object relationship high OOXML_EXTERNAL_OLE_OBJECTDocument contains an oleObject relationship whose target is an external HTTP(S) URL. Office resolves this through OLE/object update paths rather than as a normal user-clicked hyperlink.
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Embedded OLE object medium OOXML_OLE_OBJECTDocument contains an embedded OLE object
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Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URLOne or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.URL https://www.mediafire.com/file/t0gqzzcaafv8deb/MAINPAYLOAD.docx
- https://files.catbox.moe/lqc0er.hta
- https://www.mediafire.com/file/eamsi5gf1wrile2/Update.rtf
- http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
- http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
- http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
- http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
- http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
- http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
- http://www.google.com
- http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officedocument/2006/relationships/oleobject
Extracted artifacts 1
Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.
| Filename | Kind | Source | Size |
|---|---|---|---|
ooxml_oleobject_00.bin68acdc747300a4240f7c6c9f59c09e6d5fb342b20a5113e175ae5735333cc2a6 |
ooxml-ole-object | OOXML embedded OLE part: word/embeddings/----.---- | 16770 bytes |
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