Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 892193f7cd5b7492…

MALICIOUS

PDF

77.8 KB Created: 2021-06-16 02:25:23 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-09-27
MD5: ce10e0b1cbd555b982309ed8181803fd SHA-1: a35ee3de8de847dcdc14664322437c7ef32abfba SHA-256: 892193f7cd5b74924ed5ccc98e438e7c0695abf6a2d975f21afa2b37a15be024
164 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

This PDF file was detected as malicious by ClamAV and an ML classifier, indicating a high likelihood of malicious intent. It contains numerous embedded links, many pointing to compromised WordPress sites, and a visual download button lure. The primary attack pattern appears to be a link farm designed to trick users into downloading files from potentially compromised or malicious hosting, possibly as part of a phishing or malware distribution scheme.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 7

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Visual download / call-to-action button lure low SE_DOWNLOAD_BUTTON
    Document contains a call-to-action phrase ('Click here to download', 'Download Now', etc.) — low-signal unless other findings point to a malicious workflow
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://crysiq.ru/uplcv?utm_term=premiere+pro+cc+2017+templates+free+download PDF link annotation
    • http://fashioncenterpoint.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/74acdb5147977bf98315632e16d49112/xelimivamezujofivipalowob.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://shengnabei.com/uploadfile/file/%5C/2021061602112975.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.pal-kont.hu/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/81f0a7c039995431e9220a595ed72566/kaviza.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://theemperorsoldclothes.co.uk/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/v86pv1b9m5lvas9tut14res0cc/95472953355.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cradlegold.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/d966sg3q8dnqgl3v7va8ve8boe/12370043328.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ebsjosepirosamaria.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16089705797d81---fodofaxudafupifezibeje.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.gainerwindows.ca/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/j5igcc67robige7cjt3ju9ejq7/59707209585.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://glasschneider.koeln/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/lampghb7i8cfhdpqi5a2pv12ve/92835457933.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://roadtoring.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/a20dc6d38b924787631c58938a5e945a/21637912925.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://seoulsquare.com/userfiles/file/10960623807.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://corpusbg.com/files/fck/file/32355078409.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.ideaklinik.com.tr/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160c15c21ad09a---41591571474.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.darvidproperty.com/news/file/gowota.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.thediethub.in/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160791e2863754---zajolap.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://famcareconnect.org/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1607033970a021---40410885694.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://averon.ca/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1606f0880be0ea---41507356651.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000f0a3.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xF0A3 5800 bytes
SHA-256: d53bc9d8503aab67c4cd5b70d91dc39076f2106363a59cfcb082664ca4464f86
font_01_sfnt_off00010468.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x10468 11092 bytes
SHA-256: fa042ca700b7377026592455410f6b6848fd09d7c98bada8095be8cc7670e84f