Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLS — malware analysis report

Heuristics 9

• OLE2Link / URL Moniker → remote loader — CVE-2017-0199 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_0199
  Document contains an embedded OLE link object whose URL Moniker points to a remote URL. When the host file is opened, Office follows the link, downloads the URL, and processes the response based on its Content-Type (HTA -> mshta.exe, RTF → Word, etc.) — the documented CVE-2017-0199 primitive. The URL extension is not a reliable filter; servers can return different payloads to Office's user agent.
• TrueType bitmap font + active content — CVE-2023-26369 related high CVE related PDF_CVE_2023_26369_RELATED
  PDF embeds a TrueType font with bitmap tables (EBDT/sbix/CBDT) alongside exploit delivery indicators — CVE-2023-26369 exploits the sfac_GetSbitBitmap function in Adobe's libCoolType for arbitrary code execution. This CVE was actively exploited in the wild, but this rule does not validate the malformed EBLC/EBDT primitive.
• Obfuscated Pidief-style JavaScript loader (stage not decoded) high CVE related PDF_PIDIEF_OBFUSCATED_VERSION_GATED_LOADER
  PDF JavaScript carries a large opaque encoded stage (a letter-delimited numeric character-code array) that is built to be decoded and eval'd, but no exact Adobe Reader CVE could be attributed because the encoding scheme resisted full static decoding. This is the structural fingerprint of the Pidief / multi-CVE exploit-kit loader family — a version-gated obfuscated JavaScript stage with no benign use. Flagged suspicious on its own; an ML/AV signal or a recovered heap-spray pushes it to malicious.
• Secondary embedded PDF body has suspicious static findings critical POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGE
  A valid PDF body was found at a nonzero offset inside another container and its carved contents matched PDF exploit or lure heuristics. This catches polyglots where the top-level magic routes to ZIP/OLE while a PDF reader or downstream parser opens the hidden PDF payload.
• PDF JavaScript exploit cluster critical PDF_JS_EXPLOIT_CLUSTER
  PDF combines an executable JavaScript/action surface with exploit staging indicators such as eval/unescape/fromCharCode, XFA script content, or a related CVE pattern. Benign form JavaScript remains low-severity, but this correlated cluster is high-confidence malicious behavior.
• Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
  PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
• VBA project contains no executable statements info OLE_VBA_MACROS
  Document contains a VBA project, but extracted modules only contain attributes/options/comments and no executable statements.
• Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
  The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
• Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
  One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
  URL https://link.takusuki.com/wfJqTF In document text (OLE body)

  • https://wwww.microsoft.com0In document text (OLE body)
  • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/mainIn document text (OLE body)
  • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In document text (OLE body)
  • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In document text (OLE body)
  • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In document text (OLE body)
  • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In document text (OLE body)
  • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In document text (OLE body)
  • https://docs.microsoft.com/typography/abouthttp://lucasfonts.comMicrosoftIn document text (OLE body)
  • http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MIT_LicenseIn document text (OLE body)
  • http://crl.microsoft.com/pki/crl/products/MicCodSigPCA_2010-07-06.crl0ZIn document text (OLE body)
  • http://www.microsoft.com/pki/certs/MicCodSigPCA_2010-07-06.crt0In document text (OLE body)
  • http://crl.microsoft.com/pki/crl/products/MicRooCerAut_2010-06-23.crl0ZIn document text (OLE body)
  • http://www.microsoft.com/pki/certs/MicRooCerAut_2010-06-23.crt0��In document text (OLE body)
  • http://www.microsoft.com/PKI/docs/CPS/default.htm0@In document text (OLE body)
  • http://crl.microsoft.com/pki/crl/products/MicTimStaPCA_2010-07-01.crl0ZIn document text (OLE body)
  • http://www.microsoft.com/pki/certs/MicTimStaPCA_2010-07-01.crt0In document text (OLE body)
  • http://www.microsoft.com/pkiops/crl/Microsoft%20Time-Stamp%20PCA%202010(1).crl0lIn document text (OLE body)
  • http://www.microsoft.com/pkiops/certs/Microsoft%20Time-Stamp%20PCA%202010(1).crt0In document text (OLE body)
  • http://www.microsoft.com/pkiops/Docs/Repository.htm0In document text (OLE body)
  • http://www.microsoft.com/pki/certs/MicRooCerAut_2010-06-23.crt0In document text (OLE body)

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