Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 890aeb38e038e114…

MALICIOUS

PDF

89.7 KB Created: 2021-09-21 02:01:39 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2021-10-27
MD5: 96aa0c8920c58e100c1425b20fdfe9b0 SHA-1: ed9c8c1612bfefdd7fa31c2c9945e282ee5fe6db SHA-256: 890aeb38e038e114b342f239643e95a28a6ea255b66d35c98d6dc959e16e4f23
236 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.007 JavaScript

This PDF document is flagged as malicious by ML classifiers and ClamAV, indicating a phishing or trojan threat. The document employs social engineering lures, specifically impersonating cloud services and prompting the user to install a browser extension or update. This is a common tactic to facilitate credential theft or malware installation. While no scripts were directly extracted, the embedded URLs suggest potential redirection to malicious sites or compromised content delivery networks.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9974

Heuristics 9

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Browser extension / update installation lure high SE_BROWSER_INSTALL_LURE
    Document tells the user to install a browser extension, plugin, viewer, or browser update to view content — a common social-engineering path for credential theft and malware installation
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • QR-code redirect lure medium SE_QR_LURE
    Document instructs the user to scan a QR code with a phone — consistent with QR phishing, but also common in legitimate documents
  • Cloud document impersonation lure medium SE_CLOUD_DOC_LURE
    Document impersonates a cloud file-sharing service such as SharePoint, OneDrive, Google Drive, Dropbox, Box, or Microsoft 365 and asks the user to open, verify, or access a shared document
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://medvor.ru/uplcv?utm_term=can+you+transfer+data+from+android+to+iphone PDF link annotation
    • http://artsar.pl/userfiles/file/39203426402.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://3qlohas.com/CKEdit/upload/files/23058307488.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.mtpartnersfl.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16144caa8cca01---zapoxegaxetibif.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://jlgardner.org/home/jlg/public_html/ckfinder/userfiles/files/topevepisemivitexagebo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://vargyasnekonyveles.hu/kepek/other/file/77440047086.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://karthikeyanjayaram.com/userfiles/file/41074751825.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://smwiarus.pl/ckfinder/userfiles/files/97513315544.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://wenyanchem.com/upload/files/jeboferuziz.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://naseeha.org/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/8554ce1a3ea937639a14bd4f31fcb1cf/puvaliber.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://ulrike-mayer.de/userfiles/files/fumugofumogobiliraxu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://sbmhavacilik.com/userfiles/file/9873582900.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://hyunshin.net/userfiles/file/28728265883.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://airflow-skateboards.com/userfiles/files/77435036054.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://akbmodel.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1612ed6003491f---tagima.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.gsccn.it/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/161302126ad98b---bapevajadekanoku.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.temtechnologies.fr/ckfinder/userfiles/files/dusudoxulofixirugegid.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://shastriratanchatterjee.com/ckfinder/userfiles/files/vibixuduxufogavesonelizu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://stitesattorney.com/customer/3/d/9/3d947ad6ce2568d98b832ccf5548371bFile/vomulen.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://pushgroup.lv/userfiles/files/30267199480.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://tecniagua.es/uploads/ckfinder/files/96866116719.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://too.kg/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/7bf47e4b36db19a64d55ecd276bffed7/vinoxaxip.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://union.travel/ckfinder/userfiles/files/34810415023.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.injamal.es/nueva/ckfinder/userfiles/files/febizalokum.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000f559.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xF559 19316 bytes
SHA-256: 28b89475affc74940361669de88424d7365797963c8cbe964908923bf1e5e496
font_01_sfnt_off0001278e.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1278E 16792 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
font_02_sfnt_off00013fa5.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x13FA5 10964 bytes
SHA-256: 1667a28c41e6b2854d7c128ed62a23a1196b947bfb8d01423be7e19042ff7fbd

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