RTF malware analysis — malicious · 88ec66e224ff635b

MALICIOUS

RTF

115.5 KB First seen: 2024-08-02

MD5: 6e994ba970dc302eec7e0300bde115d1 SHA-1: 10025e3d88aa02938a40dd95b7c3abf03a51494d SHA-256: 88ec66e224ff635bc607747dfbf5a889eb4b2fec5be927b6a94e1f1c2b54bcf7

120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The RTF document contains an OLE object with a split Equation Editor ProgID, a known vulnerability (CVE-2017-11882). The \objupdate directive indicates that the OLE object will be activated automatically upon opening the document. This is a common delivery mechanism for malware that aims to download and execute a secondary payload. No specific family could be identified from the available evidence.

Heuristics 3

Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off00001e54.bin` `57a6f4d6b95eb01d374f9e4cae6acbbfab521fe23994a028b560af4069cc6f1f`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x1E54	2331 bytes

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