Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 88e06c9be915200f…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

298.9 KB Created: 2020-05-21 17:33:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 14.0000
MD5: 02a597cc2e56c13e7ee1c73ed63b3957 SHA-1: 76b137bd83972da30b13ec376dc01a2d383796f5 SHA-256: 88e06c9be915200fbb586d2ee9208d69fa65154e5d11076f905e516160b51083
140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.005 Visual Basic

The file is an OOXML document with a high-confidence detection for a dropper payload. A Document_Open macro was detected, indicating that malicious code executes automatically upon opening the document. The ClamAV detection name 'Doc.Dropper.HexEncodedEXEHeader-9789587-1' strongly suggests the document's purpose is to drop and execute a secondary payload. No specific malware family could be identified.

Heuristics 5

  • ClamAV: Doc.Dropper.HexEncodedEXEHeader-9789587-1 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Dropper.HexEncodedEXEHeader-9789587-1
  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
    Document contains vbaProject.bin — VBA macros present
  • Suspicious extracted artifact medium EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
5ee6d48ae142792063e9c7094a5b8da332041a84882bed574dc4b97844a59c56
vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 12213 bytes
vbaProject_00.bin
453d5b77c8c28c33286687db98318b10054e26dbe8aa674b73c8d53d7b08080c
vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 73216 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 1 shell/COM execution token(s).