Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 88c82b3e35dcb140…

MALICIOUS

PDF

67.3 KB Created: 2021-09-26 14:18:23 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3)
MD5: 0dfee801b3e4d53466413f4bfd108063 SHA-1: 1ff2891af70e54baf385af75509e6c8cc5034840 SHA-256: 88c82b3e35dcb140c3bc826953d695e5b856d2a956dfe1b84aa8d33581a8801a
134 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The PDF contains embedded JavaScript, a common technique for executing malicious code within documents. It also exhibits characteristics of a link farm, with numerous external URIs pointing to various domains, suggesting an attempt to obscure the ultimate destination or distribute payloads. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly indicate malicious intent, likely related to phishing or malware delivery.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9973

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://peak-experience-japan.com/images/blog/file/sukufakupesalezenirurula.pdf
    • http://eternaseguros.net/files/files/36480174001.pdf
    • http://tfh-filter.hu/_user/file/xudebubebisojo.pdf
    • http://sxnqx.org/upload/file/Fl202109030841234009.pdf
    • http://stsmcc.org/www/js/ckfinder/userfiles/files/jenutemas.pdf
    • https://www.bevillelecomte.com/ckfinder/userfiles/files/pukikepikosetewopilax.pdf
    • http://matsusushionline.com/uploads/files/mabosogovemujowixowet.pdf
    • https://thehouseproduction.net/file/22523669059.pdf
    • http://bxbrdh.marketsearching.com/upload/files/zutaradi.pdf
    • https://transmilenio.net/datamont/userfiles/file/gupape.pdf
    • https://vibangnhadat.com/uploads/files/89896270070.pdf
    • http://artc-polymers.com/upload/images/files/48766608329.pdf
    • http://bachova-terapia.sk/images/file/46080862028.pdf
    • http://brenderup.ro/mm/file/36770703105.pdf
    • https://pasarant0g3l-turbo-h1t.com/contents/files/76007100009.pdf
    • http://gaudi.tw/upload/files/51833740543.pdf
    • https://rinducm1.com/contents/files/75365061356.pdf
    • https://emenu.hu/editor_up/mebezujesamufonok.pdf
    • https://xn--interpeas-r6a.es/upload/files/xiguwunafozufez.pdf
    • http://55pluscommunityspecialist.com/userfiles/files/91479076445.pdf
    • http://work4shop.cz/userfiles/file/zixegun.pdf
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/Uplcv/~3/ngfLrbzwjls/uplcv?utm_term=how+do+i+unhack+my+android+phone
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/License

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000aacc.bin
cd2b1959dae891162d71d56e0b0df2b5cf94085a174343045044a6d7c2e71e58		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xAACC 14512 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0000cf3d.bin
37a8d4954d816fd136e39e8bee37a5bdb01e1c2f84e6f4af537eb4fa40095af5		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xCF3D 10852 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off0000e817.bin
9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE817 16792 bytes

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