Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 88a7d67502e7cb3e…

MALICIOUS

PDF

36.3 KB Created: 2020-08-03 07:12:17 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: 8bd2946eaa7aba8a319b19261dae9956 SHA-1: 81910597aec6df9ddc6f94d77a49b50a652a1dd5 SHA-256: 88a7d67502e7cb3e33ac2b9caa7f90a7d5705fd8383ef5c9082fba436db4d14e
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.002 Phishing: Spearphishing Attachment T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell

The PDF contains a link that redirects to a known malicious domain, masquerading as a free YouTube logo maker. This is further supported by the PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM heuristic, indicating a large number of generated links, likely for SEO manipulation or to obscure the final destination. The document body contains obfuscated text and embedded URLs, including the primary malicious redirector.

Heuristics 3

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.com/pify?keyword=free+youtube+logo+maker
    • http://files.chelseagilmoreart.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130775472/4572719.pdf
    • http://files.rapidrestoreaz.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130873877/lakebalovujepi.pdf
    • http://files.smuphideltatheta.com/uploads/1/3/2/3/132302941/d4d35a1ab.pdf
    • http://files.timothyrogersphotography.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130874143/a9f79f944d.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0429/9712/1178/files/83893367821.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/2937/2821/files/sojixeseruzojoralo.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0435/1524/8794/files/8599524204.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/84574839703.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/4054/6714/files/35658504151.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0434/7153/6285/files/30135351800.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/5425/9606/files/xefisufavasemazikeku.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0438/4188/0224/files/26906636482.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0429/1434/9219/files/mimuwiwutatokamipidawivod.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0434/5089/2454/files/kontakt_activate_crack.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/3583/6059/files/63268962874.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0437/6671/0433/files/mujijedabig.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/2955/2552/files/zuxujedizibabivap.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00005339.bin
517a555121fa532e3eed4bb7b624ec9bdad6e1b469a4d39534a5d1dcfa430eb0		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x5339 5088 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off00006483.bin
b61553ef3039468b96645c3fed3c1ccc6f1330a5fc31e0ad1830b0c3c92af134		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6483 9496 bytes

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.