Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 88478956ea6c8ea5…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

1.30 MB Created: 2019-09-17 13:59:00
MD5: 3e734589bebe665471dec5c6342b1df3 SHA-1: 08a241bc943f69b937e6df4bd231d19d81b84128 SHA-256: 88478956ea6c8ea5423e2c30e23fbbf893f4ebbcaa3718d407ac418bf9964c0e
200 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.001 Malicious Link T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.001 PowerShell

The file is an RTF document that leverages the Equation Editor and exploits CVE-2017-8759 to trigger OLE object activation. This indicates an attempt to execute arbitrary code. The presence of OLE object data and the specific CVE exploited strongly suggest a malicious payload delivery mechanism. No specific family could be identified, but the exploit vector is clear.

Heuristics 6

  • CVE-2017-8759 — MSXML SAX OLE activation critical CVE likely CVE_2017_8759
    RTF contains a hex-encoded OLE1 object for Msxml2.SAXXMLReader.6.0 followed by an embedded OLE compound document, and the document requests OLE activation. This matches the RTF staging shape used for CVE-2017-8759 SOAP/WSDL parser code injection.
  • Equation Editor CLSID critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Equation Editor OLE CLSID found inside an OLE object — exploited by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 / CVE-2018-0798
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2003/wordml

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off001431fd.bin
42d527e4a267fec919595f2a34e33bf8aad2199eb8c794b8a8925ddb860e876a		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1431FD 3732 bytes

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