Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 880f29e4227b73e1…

MALICIOUS

PDF

44.4 KB Created: 2020-10-17 00:06:05 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: a1045e70c21059d8356a2ad942550460 SHA-1: 83e134bfde57efad33bf0cb06c0363271d7117d6 SHA-256: 880f29e4227b73e10c62d25ceb81106e466f36145d703072347b880213f3be91
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains a prominent link that redirects to a URL seemingly offering an "apk" download, suggesting a lure for users seeking software. The presence of numerous other PDF links, many hosted on disposable domains, indicates a link farm designed to drive traffic to potentially malicious destinations. The ML classifier strongly supports the malicious nature of this PDF.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.me/123?keyword=descargar+badland+premium+apk+2020
    • https://sesuwulot.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131438847/bagisegodex-famasunaxuku-bugofotebisig-sisajiriwa.pdf
    • https://riwisasivituw.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/0/131070703/146d032f56d235.pdf
    • https://nukevokisoget.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/7/132711970/paberemete.pdf
    • https://takijotirodone.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/6/131637658/jakajivarekabifiw.pdf
    • https://boguvetasitob.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131380850/02566.pdf
    • https://dutitujazekap.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130814390/fubisi.pdf
    • https://bedizegoresupa.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131379398/vunidixeviro_xitosujitupile_kadape.pdf
    • https://fimosezit.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130775491/7990526.pdf
    • https://xojisige.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/6/131637148/panufifil.pdf
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4366015/normal_5f895455347cc.pdf
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4366337/normal_5f872546637d8.pdf
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4372985/normal_5f88dde34cc35.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0495/9171/3958/files/96903380667.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0432/2315/4850/files/ffx_chocobo_eater_key_sphere.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0496/0953/9747/files/1.5-3_oz_in_ml.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0434/8962/4224/files/peterubikudupomu.pdf
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/256aca6a-c6ee-48ac-b29e-6e35f51bed37/jutadodugovipifi.pdf
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/c46b919d-5c8e-4e18-8eed-94562b3effa1/80783471677.pdf
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/65f206e3-c882-44ba-8dd3-c0a5d12bd28f/64116308132.pdf
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/db32911b-6d08-46ea-b385-1d6f8d69611d/fobugoxi.pdf
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/93b0ea7b-bbe9-41ee-b9ad-312c8a18b7e2/31953966459.pdf
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/3addc5cc-3f43-486c-badf-e2f5b31c6cfa/gijox.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00006cfb.bin
3e15624259c7735d4210e54eafb653a491932ef8a87c6658f5c9e961d57983d0		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6CFB 5868 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off000080d9.bin
e4bec78d5eb356aabdc3833f2a447e7cd5af056bcde4c62ddc5d9bcb4c2438ac		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x80D9 10292 bytes

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