Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 87f5cc40dd22c795…

MALICIOUS

PDF

75.8 KB Created: 2021-06-09 11:33:18 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: 595cb716626752d7a76d15e98f3a799b SHA-1: 848cf83ad24a1030a1cbbe0450cda8bebc937f2b SHA-256: 87f5cc40dd22c7957c74bee2e2c3ba254954492e8a0fce3cbdea55631dca9a2b
164 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains numerous links to compromised websites, suggesting a phishing or malware distribution attempt. The presence of a 'download button' heuristic further supports the lure of downloading a payload. ClamAV detection confirms the malicious nature of the file, classifying it as Pdf.Phishing.Trojan.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 7

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Visual download / call-to-action button lure low SE_DOWNLOAD_BUTTON
    Document contains a call-to-action phrase ('Click here to download', 'Download Now', etc.) — low-signal unless other findings point to a malicious workflow
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://pixomot.ru/uplcv?utm_term=original+vidmate+apps
    • https://afriqueitnews.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/e7d4ac395f4e6f4fe611188e4b0e4278/88765505469.pdf
    • https://www.herewardcarpets.co.uk/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/9d67rh8c36ed5ncfaetcg2fna6/93397563104.pdf
    • http://www.kevinbrooks.ca/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1607b99c55c834---xerirotujokazumigakudes.pdf
    • https://www.etbsupplies.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160a0e23667eae---fesuxagonirovuboza.pdf
    • http://acetuitioncentre.com.au/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160bdad1062b39---18379542705.pdf
    • https://vivekanandbawwa.com/userfiles/file/sewubaja.pdf
    • https://www.sevgiliyevideo.net/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160810844cb8c0---tatow.pdf
    • http://www.ausafrica.co.za/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1609b4cfe7f412---vosuwutug.pdf
    • http://christembassydocklands.org/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/434379f9138aec0e01f93b147f23806d/ximebelixulobufutuvugo.pdf
    • http://test.uebersetzungen-nesselberger.de/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160b05606b814d---nizozefowawa.pdf
    • https://higher-reason.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/1r8pee2hv6ucaclfq8dqet7v1g/8630089661.pdf
    • https://mls.lighting/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/e83d3276a205df13d88f60ed666b1d3d/gawalem.pdf
    • http://stylist.in.ua/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160730b79281fb---mitoj.pdf
    • http://wksystems.net/HotelEstimator/userfiles/file/jebekirugej.pdf
    • https://www.physioaktivkramer.de/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160ac18e871552---80903462563.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000ea44.bin
b0a6bef9a30f3e8952f0ad7a749bc4d68a64dd5957a619fa38392f80e9d543b7		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xEA44 5364 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0000fc72.bin
5f0302ab94b8605e3f6fa06489ac1279a56de56f7975cc612e74d460394c0477		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xFC72 11088 bytes

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