Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 87f2e7b59de3815e…

MALICIOUS

RTF

9.9 KB
MD5: dacf43fb90dd8834b029af94b8ebe18a SHA-1: 1108c0248e2756e1a228e3def966f7131dede89e SHA-256: 87f2e7b59de3815e87cf4397f16f986716f5335b9cb2cd46afffd9239dbfaa33
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample is an RTF document that contains OLE object data and specifically targets the Equation Editor vulnerability. The ".objupdate" directive indicates that the embedded OLE object will be activated automatically. This suggests the document is designed to exploit this vulnerability to download and execute a secondary payload. No specific family could be identified, but the attack pattern is consistent with known exploit delivery methods.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000012cb.bin
1819a3597b5f045c9c5d68be76c3aa5ff8275be80b2d1631315e38d39c4748c9
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x12CB 1927 bytes