Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLS — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 87bddfda1f72f77f…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

290.0 KB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel First seen: 2023-05-02
MD5: 649ce60d0d8764bdd5dda73685b29fd2 SHA-1: c7d4a865e80f6fc5fdbce0719acb76df8874ddc3 SHA-256: 87bddfda1f72f77f1e9dbb680525d4cb8b62a3e573a99675ed494893294bf8f8
112 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.005 Visual Basic

The sample is an OLE file that exploits CVE-2017-0199 via a URL moniker to download a remote document. The embedded VBA macros are present but appear to contain no executable statements, suggesting the exploit relies on the OLE vulnerability itself. The embedded PDF also contains suspicious findings, indicating a multi-stage attack. The primary IOC is the URL used for the initial payload download.

Heuristics 5

  • OLE2Link / URL Moniker → remote loader — CVE-2017-0199 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_0199
    Document contains an embedded OLE link object whose URL Moniker points to a remote URL. When the host file is opened, Office follows the link, downloads the URL, and processes the response based on its Content-Type (HTA -> mshta.exe, RTF → Word, etc.) — the documented CVE-2017-0199 primitive. The URL extension is not a reliable filter; servers can return different payloads to Office's user agent.
  • Secondary embedded PDF body has suspicious static findings high POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGE
    A valid PDF body was found at a nonzero offset inside another container and its carved contents matched PDF exploit or lure heuristics. This catches polyglots where the top-level magic routes to ZIP/OLE while a PDF reader or downstream parser opens the hidden PDF payload.
  • VBA project contains no executable statements low OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains a VBA project, but extracted modules only contain attributes/options/comments and no executable statements.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://192.3.202.72/c/%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23.doc

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
7f506327609c082af1cd37dde23bc2c71a000f7d1ef530b6abb66775040a7673		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1206 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00011400.pdf
354f212c561605021532afc8b4b2953b3a39919feda5751b5df054a5554d7b3f		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x11400 226304 bytes

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