Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 879cc016198b5fee…

MALICIOUS

PDF

11.8 KB
MD5: 5397ff9e2fcc512a03e95d015fec56ec SHA-1: b25673250a5c52129f0861326faca4c6b38f07f2 SHA-256: 879cc016198b5feee014a227809ef6aebc8cd309ef194bd3f1c96474c86d28a8
186 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 PowerShell T1204.002 Malicious Link

The PDF file contains embedded JavaScript, specifically identified as a stager for CVE-2007-5659 using the 'collab.collectEmailInfo' method. This JavaScript is heavily obfuscated but is designed to decode and execute further malicious code. The presence of multiple JavaScript streams and the critical heuristic firings strongly indicate an exploit attempt within the PDF document.

Heuristics 7

  • Collab.collectEmailInfo — CVE-2007-5659 critical CVE exact CVE_2007_5659
    PDF JavaScript calls Collab.collectEmailInfo — CVE-2007-5659 is a buffer overflow in Adobe Reader triggered by a long argument or heap-sprayed message field passed to Collab.collectEmailInfo(). Part of a series of Acrobat JS API exploits. (identified after JavaScript deobfuscation)
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Exploit.Agent-36063 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Exploit.Agent-36063
  • Annotation subject callee-key hex JavaScript stager high PDF_ANNOT_SUBJECT_CALLEE_HEX_STAGER
    PDF JavaScript uses syncAnnotScan()/getAnnots() to read an indirect annotation /Subject stream, percent-decodes it through marker replacement, then uses a callee.toString()-derived key to decode and eval the final exploit stage.
  • JavaScript action low PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • syncAnnotScan annotation-staging primitive low PDF_FOXIT_SYNCANNOTSCAN
    PDF JavaScript calls syncAnnotScan() — a no-op annotation-enumeration primitive used by exploit-kit JavaScript to stage payload reads from annotation /Subject fields before eval(). Not a vulnerable sink itself; rarely seen in legitimate PDFs. (matched in decompressed stream)
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
javascript_obj0007_000.js
eb39e2de4dbbc100de6d3e30aa43ff78fa075618862ba1ebba5151ea3a3b848d
pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 7 at offset 0x19D 273 bytes
annotation_subject_callee_hex_stage_000.js
aa83e11f78df751a17d9aec228eed3b5a87a6f43034483a6aec26a30e955fb9b
deobfuscated-js annotation-subject callee-key decoded JavaScript at offset 0x14A 5026 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 5 eval/decoder/string-building token(s).
deobfuscated.js
115737990ddb12753f2900d017a8df4925ea8d58551fdb3d2f7eaa7af9680c45
deobfuscated-js PDF JavaScript deobfuscation pass 70929 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 1 long base64-like blob(s).