Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 87910624df2a9f0f…

MALICIOUS

RTF

110.3 KB First seen: 2023-08-18
MD5: 0d8453b3475ec7707f234ca4b644ef18 SHA-1: 4c14eed813e225929e98e011d1a31759b2932c6a SHA-256: 87910624df2a9f0f48c640d127e88417764f96c7a66f38336dfe8da6d0e96c2f
160 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 Malicious Link T1204.002 Malicious Link: Malicious File T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter T1059.005 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Visual Basic

The file is an RTF document containing an embedded OLE object, specifically targeting the Equation Editor vulnerability. The document body includes a lure instructing the user to 'click Enable editing', which is a common tactic to bypass security measures. The presence of RTF_OBJDATA, RTF_OBJEMB, RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR, and RTF_OBJUPDATE heuristics strongly indicates an exploit attempt via the Equation Editor. The SE_ENABLE_LURE heuristic further confirms the social engineering aspect to trick the user into activating the exploit.

Heuristics 5

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00003e11.bin
04aa7e5b56a9ef08250a215791632ff2404a78631edfc5439a5d37209b27562e
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x3E11 1987 bytes