Office (OLE) / .XLS malware analysis — malicious · 878cc5236185a715

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

1.18 MB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel

MD5: 6f2a878e9ae626636774a6b2287862f1 SHA-1: 0ee410c21e5646c9f7ed325225a46bc1b1efa700 SHA-256: 878cc5236185a715acf0f76fb12b5bb3a6aa60a374fd81514ca83f2fa7a30efb

108 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.005 Visual Basic

The critical heuristic firing indicates exploitation of CVE-2017-0199 via an OLE2Link object, which is designed to download and execute a remote loader from the URL 'https://techuntangler.tools/NtoG0a'. The presence of a VBA macro, though not directly executable, suggests a potential delivery mechanism. The embedded PDF also shows suspicious static findings, indicating a multi-stage attack.

Heuristics 4

OLE2Link / URL Moniker → remote loader — CVE-2017-0199 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_0199

Document contains an embedded OLE link object whose URL Moniker points to a remote URL. When the host file is opened, Office follows the link, downloads the URL, and processes the response based on its Content-Type (HTA -> mshta.exe, RTF → Word, etc.) — the documented CVE-2017-0199 primitive. The URL extension is not a reliable filter; servers can return different payloads to Office's user agent.
Secondary embedded PDF body has suspicious static findings high POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGE

A valid PDF body was found at a nonzero offset inside another container and its carved contents matched PDF exploit or lure heuristics. This catches polyglots where the top-level magic routes to ZIP/OLE while a PDF reader or downstream parser opens the hidden PDF payload.
VBA project contains no executable statements low OLE_VBA_MACROS

Document contains a VBA project, but extracted modules only contain attributes/options/comments and no executable statements.
Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL

One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.

URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`macros.bas` `7f506327609c082af1cd37dde23bc2c71a000f7d1ef530b6abb66775040a7673`	vba-macro	oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source)	1206 bytes
`font_00_sfnt_off000010ab.bin` `41c2901ebda5b5d79d4a68e71278578ac4fe004bea942385b0ed0c502c07b584`	pdf-font-stream	PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x10AB	88240 bytes
`polyglot_child_pdf_off00096e00.pdf` `f85847ecd384bc2771fbf7d464a9ea4c8fb52845ef14e6c4c427b585f83e0e4f`	polyglot-child-pdf	Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x96E00	617984 bytes

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