Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 8783e831b4682706…

MALICIOUS

PDF

76.8 KB Created: 2021-09-11 07:45:09 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2021-10-05
MD5: 60dcff6d4da6289107b9816bff0dcf0e SHA-1: 67dddc55ba0f75022331eafdf9828c60a1c6728f SHA-256: 8783e831b4682706fe12d3c4a6dada9a0f57a302ab05b71de3695c272dbc4393
256 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The PDF contains multiple links pointing to compromised WordPress upload storage and other disposable hosting, indicating a link farm designed to distribute malicious files. The heuristic 'SE_PASSWORD_ARCHIVE_LURE' suggests the document instructs the user to open a password-protected archive, a common tactic to bypass gateway security. While no scripts were directly extracted, the presence of numerous external links and the overall structure strongly suggest a phishing or malware distribution attempt.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9973

Heuristics 9

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • PDF link to algorithmically-generated URL high PDF_RANDOM_URL_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable HTTP(S) link whose host looks algorithmically generated (pronounceable-random labels) and whose path/query carries a long high-entropy token. This is the randomized-redirector pattern of malspam phishing lures — the visible document is only a prompt — not a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Password-protected archive handoff high SE_PASSWORD_ARCHIVE_LURE
    Document gives password instructions for an archive or attachment — often used to keep payloads encrypted until after gateway scanning
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • QR-code redirect lure medium SE_QR_LURE
    Document instructs the user to scan a QR code with a phone — consistent with QR phishing, but also common in legitimate documents
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://munnartourism.com/uploads/file/73698195480.pdf In PDF document text
    • http://inimtrento.it/userfiles/files/29892630539.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://ciarajewellery.com/editor_upload/file/55208142212.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://testagenda1.myagenda.cz/pictures/editor/files/nosag.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://sysyanginguvenlik.com/uploads/files/56980229140.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://vom-ragnaroek.de/uploads/file/84506772710.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.denisonlandscaping.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16133fd94e463b---pokorefirubar.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://wsystem.sk/userfiles/files/48878980400.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://library.nesdb.go.th/ic/admin/ckfinder/userfiles/files/28557927250.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://pentas.eu/userfiles/file/wotib.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.funes.gob.ar/ckfinder/userfiles/files/lugosupuzanogokixawotin.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://labotinnghia.com/img/files/23719210555.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://greenlakepaint.com/ckfinder/userfiles/files/sonori.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://pasationtravellers.com/root/FCKeditor/file/76734679398.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://northmarking.com/userfiles/files/97118998594.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.sunarnuricomuisvealisverismerkezi.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/m1rpng9safeh4b6gsqp9t3l9o2/mibowu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://hodinovysoused.cz/upload/file/27492683018.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.northamericatalk.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1613168f64f37f---zaroto.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://fluffy-chins.com/images/file/varexaj.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://caffepontoni.com/uploads/file/bizexajefapasabobatevum.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://rkenterprisesonline.com/FCKeditor/file/nirosirozatesejemanoka.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://reklama-kemerovo.ru/files/files/91975110613.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://selectwifi.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/161311e2cb3169---52964761952.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://elsped.hu/files/file/vikefik.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://teleinwestor.com/userfiles/file/26656692817.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/Uplcv/~3/BvfzZFkJO3s/uplcv?utm_term=can+i+scan+a+qr+code+on+my+iphone+screenPDF link annotation
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000c5f8.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xC5F8 16792 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
font_01_sfnt_off0000de0a.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xDE0A 17776 bytes
SHA-256: 768f2e5356a5d542005e2b8ed4b36f976cec3c9b3c315453437a1e1ae988e0d1
font_02_sfnt_off00010c17.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x10C17 10924 bytes
SHA-256: f08fe840a73f6f1210966fa9eafb720d8b389ff240fc305e879722a967a730ae