Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 8774cbc8e573701d…

MALICIOUS

PDF

67.5 KB Created: 2020-11-04 17:02:28 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-05-22
MD5: 4231856d2c5fdd1dc3f06181217189d6 SHA-1: 1c48c03044ad8621b12d5cd1760b664e061aa2d0 SHA-256: 8774cbc8e573701d5490416b79116ac4d4992e4b4d089541a5e3d8ae72b95b38
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains numerous embedded links, with one specifically pointing to a known malicious redirector. The document body, though heavily obfuscated, contains a URL that appears to be the primary lure. The ML classifier strongly indicates maliciousness, and the heuristic firings confirm the presence of malicious redirector and link farm behaviors.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://cctraff.ru/strik?keyword=phantom+tollbooth+map+printable In PDF document text
    • https://babinekisifuve.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/6/132696104/b89edc097.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://gozarijaleb.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134337750/d82a38e2513bc4.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4372723/normal_5f9f28128fd39.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kinojapi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/3/132302846/d9e87f29e.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://jopalezaleloloj.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131380469/18ad3849e.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://wuserugojikenek.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/5/134513610/8510712.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0268/8630/8017/files/beromatetifukeraj.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/f2575334-5c49-40a6-b9f4-148e256cb29b/homegrown_herbs_a_complete_guide_to_growing_using_and_enjoying_more_than_100_herbs.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/0f279ce1-fe75-4984-b8ad-c385d3a4c4d8/vaviwulozomaxatadawiguku.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/1106ef0e-6fe8-4eee-b283-eba308d0e53d/80785629215.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/2c819980-804a-4c5c-828a-550a3af447f3/95234902257.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/1b154dc8-28e6-414a-acc5-3f7cced28e9b/37061655878.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000cb23.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xCB23 5020 bytes
SHA-256: ae73f5c63830eedea77be2560553623c8b53e71ae25ed96bd40bf84cd9e7256a
font_01_sfnt_off0000dc06.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xDC06 10824 bytes
SHA-256: 84d69f9c837f33174d4414a9cbef6680b22ee44a83cce9a80d0bedbc0a724f66

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