Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 8770f445c501edf6…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOC

775.6 KB Created: 2021-03-03 09:57:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000
MD5: f0997b178d0a74aaf3e00089fe30624f SHA-1: b79f4f71dbd4043ae71795e91f6e85b2af957a32 SHA-256: 8770f445c501edf62c9bdf28143e6da5b55d493cac5797b6ecdd81775f76e0da
382 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

The sample contains a VBA macro with a Document_Open auto-execution subroutine. This subroutine uses ShellExecute to run a file named '3.exe' from the temporary directory, which is constructed from concatenated strings. The macro also attempts to create a registry key for persistence. The ClamAV detection of 'Doc.Dropper.Hancitor-9845854-0' and the presence of an embedded OLE object with executable indicators further support its malicious nature as a dropper.

Heuristics 10

  • OOXML Ole10Native with payload/link indicators — possible CVE-2026-21514 high CVE likely CVE_2026_21514
    Office document contains embedded OLE (word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin) with Ole10Native plus executable, PE, or risky remote-link indicators. This is a likely CVE-2026-21514 exploitation shape.
  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • ClamAV: Doc.Dropper.Hancitor-9845854-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Dropper.Hancitor-9845854-0
  • ClamAV detection on extracted artifact critical EXTRACTED_FILE_CLAMAV
    ClamAV flagged at least one file extracted from inside this sample. Even when the wrapping document carries no AV detection of its own, a hit on the carved artifact is a strong indicator the sample is a delivery vehicle.
  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
  • Embedded OLE object medium OOXML_OLE_OBJECT
    Document contains an embedded OLE object
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/9/8/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2015/10/21/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/9/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/10/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/11/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/12/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/13/chartex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/5/14/chartex
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2016/ink
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2017/model3d
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2016/wordml/cid
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symex
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 5

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
651de466a97a44490cc71c975253b2e8ace0e0ca3b3cfe1b3db7d53758c84e2b		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 4538 bytes
ooxml_oleobject_00.bin
998e929981c18e917935eaa15f9ac33358f778806e076c501e11580e8ae4948d		 ooxml-ole-object OOXML embedded OLE part: word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin 183296 bytes
ooxml_oleobject_00_ole10native_00.bin
41818d6aff021cf523021e40eb2be62780a550f2bf981d2b9ef564b85a7b6d4b		 ole-package OOXML word/embeddings/oleObject1.bin Ole10Native stream: Ole10Native 173901 bytes
vbaProject_00.bin
0894ebd1b122483cbe33d99e373e212ac90b1cceef8d191744e7356fa714970a		 vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 36864 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: Doc.Dropper.Hancitor-9845854-0
Obfuscation or payload: unlikely
emf_00.emf
d431648c5172c6dd7fb9799b08232e2011ccc364124a1b1b2ea0e0c10c5187bd		 ooxml-emf OOXML EMF part: word/media/image2.emf 5000 bytes

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