Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 875cd9d606e0545e…

MALICIOUS

PDF

44.1 KB Created: 2020-07-09 05:09:20 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2020-08-25
MD5: 42e4c913f820aad067474382c3f03e6e SHA-1: 238cc39438c529743e5f7b08aa782a9c3a32ffd1 SHA-256: 875cd9d606e0545efa17d98f5d907faae7cde1a703be00a147298067ecfa297f
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

This PDF document functions as a link farm, directing users to numerous external websites, one of which is identified as a malicious redirector. The document's content is minimal, primarily serving as a lure with a title related to chart patterns. The extensive list of URLs embedded within the document, many pointing to disposable domains, strongly suggests an attempt to drive traffic to potentially malicious or scam-related content.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.com/wb?keyword=bullish%20and%20bearish%20chart%20patterns%20pdf In PDF document text
    • http://files.pamsteashoppe.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131384789/59b03f6f49c09c.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.snobz.co/uploads/1/3/1/3/131383982/df3c80.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.fitnessfactory1.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130739567/3499249.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.polktwp.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130813546/fasal-sorek-kuxopusonaminam.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.innerheartpathways.com/uploads/1/3/2/6/132681002/46e9335.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.vexsens.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130775846/waforumuwanaxogudo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.eguastella.com/uploads/1/3/1/8/131871690/4656610.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.familylawyerminnesota.com/uploads/1/3/1/6/131607712/jubigi_vomikewupinoz.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.fnaq.org/uploads/1/3/0/9/130969944/nivubuluro.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://jigofewiw.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/bavibidaxaxevedixetowoka.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://tumolodiku.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/vudugetiruvi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://wurumopo.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/88639920738.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://fajebatisik.files.wordpress.com/2020/07/38607421686.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://katazixabat.files.wordpress.com/2020/07/tifuvamepafe.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://mijukuwojaw.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/rufitenipovidakedemoba.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://gamikedunodu.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/84769303811.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/sakemiribukewud.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/juzopuzenafososokazulu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/31321710084.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Related samples 8

Ranked by shared artifacts, heuristics, extracted URLs, CVEs, and signatures.

Full JSON: related samples API

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00006f30.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6F30 5204 bytes
SHA-256: 5168245d7770ce5018f069872026229d7abd9e8e1a6767419151d7eed9706da2
font_01_sfnt_off000080c1.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x80C1 10056 bytes
SHA-256: a260e11611fdeeef83064bad02d091b48e8042c6b16da9e503460dc333e6e09d

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