Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 875898f7ecc036d6…

MALICIOUS

PDF

38.0 KB Created: 2020-10-19 02:52:45 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2026-05-04
MD5: 9e4e1bcf8494a7a693600e95d09e2fe3 SHA-1: 8d7e57095aad066096fd76bfdf78ae55ac747361 SHA-256: 875898f7ecc036d6f48d0cbd677502e3cace50d7b53f58013a6ea4137ed1b9ac
214 Risk Score

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 6

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • PDF carries website-builder CDN document link farm medium PDF_CDN_PDF_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains many clickable PDF links parked on website-builder CDNs or simple download gateways together with visible ebook, manual, or download lure text. This matches generated SEO document carriers used to route users through untrusted link/download chains; the PDF itself is an inert link carrier.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://cctraff.ru/wb?keyword=saxon%20math%208/7%20with%20pre%20algebra%20answer%20key%20pdf In PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4375093/normal_5f8a77565b779.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4368478/normal_5f87e472a1911.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4367299/normal_5f8cb1f67b9c1.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4366639/normal_5f8cbe666267e.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4369796/normal_5f8b715aecf12.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4366035/normal_5f87173ac1263.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4370068/normal_5f8cc5568d515.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://derodaju.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/6/131606282/kexip.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://lipowuripipu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131378852/8037be8d9f902.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://tibiwurab.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/6/132695994/lafirokevezirukoja.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kusanogiwaxug.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130873987/4202031.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://sanuvexugivi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/6/131606490/0f4937e54b27.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4374520/normal_5f8cae2402f77.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4366033/normal_5f87a49e708dd.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4365998/normal_5f8717cf17f4a.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In extracted file (font_00_sfnt_off0000541c.bin)
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn extracted file (font_00_sfnt_off0000541c.bin)
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0496/1861/6473/files/cen_tech_98025_digital_multimeter_manual.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/d534f352-8af3-4513-abf0-bac0a328e37d/juwijinozuxadukobuk.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/9e98b575-dce2-4caf-a5d5-ebd0d3823464/55386128154.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/54ac0dd6-cc92-4a4c-9155-256dc4281f1e/nadobinaxalet.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/e91c57f8-c9f7-4bf2-89f9-c1625774be45/71208788080.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn extracted file (font_00_sfnt_off0000541c.bin)

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000541c.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x541C 6336 bytes
SHA-256: 8940007fb1a6d6dbdd072671f2b6bb17440338d371fb6f0920c46c12647e33c4
font_01_sfnt_off00006991.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6991 9788 bytes
SHA-256: f1b882636b5d8d7f18bfbc44bf828662fe432ebb0845ddce17f0d92b092e1d78