Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 874f4fa0727b63e7…

MALICIOUS

PDF

80.8 KB Created: 2021-09-19 20:12:35 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2021-11-02
MD5: 60bccdd84abb020eb2ce8f435080b048 SHA-1: 90ca3d014f7e8e9c93e1b8de9657eb3b1a43abb0 SHA-256: 874f4fa0727b63e7c5fe76070e350d77f32810b898b4db35f3d137d17cfdf891
204 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

This PDF file was flagged as malicious by ClamAV and an ML classifier, indicating a high likelihood of malicious intent. It contains embedded JavaScript and numerous external URLs, many hosted on compromised CMS platforms or disposable domains, suggesting it's designed to redirect users to phishing sites or download further malware. The presence of both QR code and callback lures further supports a phishing or social engineering attack pattern.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9960

Heuristics 9

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • QR-code redirect lure medium SE_QR_LURE
    Document instructs the user to scan a QR code with a phone — consistent with QR phishing, but also common in legitimate documents
  • Callback phishing phone lure medium SE_CALLBACK_LURE
    Document asks the user to call a phone number in billing, refund, subscription, fraud, or security context — consistent with callback phishing or tech-support scam patterns. Suppressed for legitimate-issuer (IRS/gov/official-form) documents that carry no urgency or charge/dispute escalation.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://coretry.ru/uplcv?utm_term=private+instagram+account+unlock PDF link annotation
    • https://laneopx.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16140a2f32a5db---muwovukubovadubeg.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://we2meeting.com/ckfinder/userfiles/publics/files/sotij.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://octvads.site/js/ckfinder/userfiles/files/47944537164.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.adoz.cz/ckfinder/userfiles/files/nozafakasumepekezot.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://studiodabo.eu/userfiles/files/mazugeruvoxibojinevoxefit.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://alpinashop.bg/files/98898038863.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://777mto.org/contents/files/97792165784.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://aristi-trap.com/upload/users/files/43248916714.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://mr-alian.com/upload/ckfinder/files/84395081890.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://cloudinfo01.smartevolve.com/images/ckeditor/files/maraganezovowama.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xn--80ag1a2a.xn--p1ai/files/file/lejojolekokulomawinaj.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://braindevelopmentmaps-org.neurondevelopment.org/userfiles/files/45716359768.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://pharma-tools.eu/galeria/file/marurixizu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://vroa.pl/chplusfiles/file/18785746388.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://ucinnovation.ru/admin/ckfinder/userfiles/files/48574822723.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://trucraftsmanship.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/161408c96b6e12---84903653744.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://bilbox.es/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/ed31b489a980bb3d3c422286444f5446/20304284698.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://triangle-electronics.com/assets/userfiles/file/52235636461.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://advicezone.org.uk/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/rret4qds5cvan8cijfa8q966of/dunefakulebi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://scard.vn/app/webroot/uploads/files/50326088532.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://j1ent.com/userfiles/file/20210901103513.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://szyuangang.com/UserFiles/file///28645754213.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://ramseier-appenzell.ch/elrada/js/ckfinder/userfiles/files/dafajuxopuvofimarunobos.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000d73a.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xD73A 16792 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
font_01_sfnt_off0000ef4c.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xEF4C 17784 bytes
SHA-256: 2e28ca24f0e4789198dd5741c1f5fd6df0b6d0bb2e8e77ffac89d1cf7f68fbbd
font_02_sfnt_off00011cf1.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x11CF1 10832 bytes
SHA-256: 12c0396ce3a0783283e1a824a08daf22f81e9546a634ad279e3af4cdc8aaafdd

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.