Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 87224f5e2ed579a0…

MALICIOUS

RTF

41.9 KB First seen: 2023-07-26
MD5: 51dfac37926ca4687d0a84dd43f491ce SHA-1: f247fba3f30d5a6af74d2ce7aab25af65e1c9a20 SHA-256: 87224f5e2ed579a0b01bcb5468f6bd141061cfbec7ec519ab43871c49756ec21
140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The RTF file contains an embedded OLE object and specifically targets the Equation Editor, a known vector for exploits. The 'SE_ENABLE_LURE' heuristic indicates the document prompts the user to enable editing, which is a common social engineering tactic to bypass security measures. The presence of the OLE object data suggests an attempt to execute malicious code or exploit a vulnerability upon activation.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000054a7.bin
1c00170c09f204865dfddc192ede3cf4c4caccb5f1e5aa12426104c470ea0e6b
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x54A7 1530 bytes