Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 87063163343731e6…

MALICIOUS

PDF

47.1 KB Created: 2020-07-10 14:06:13 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: fd697907b6017358f284521df09e5e1c SHA-1: 36fba4b0a4f4594708bd27178db995fcf9cb10fe SHA-256: 87063163343731e665e37adf1542069fb0b7c235bf9d993c1c4367fb7f7f92e7
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF document contains a large number of embedded URLs, many of which point to disposable hosting domains and appear to be part of a link farm. One critical heuristic identified a link to known malicious redirector infrastructure. The document body, while containing garbled text, also includes URLs that likely serve as lures to malicious sites, potentially for phishing or malware distribution. No scripts were extracted from this sample, but the extensive use of external links suggests a redirection-based attack.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.ru/pify?keyword=fusionner+document+pdf+gratuit
    • http://files.magiccarpetsofchattanoogatn.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130739063/2560548.pdf
    • http://files.grimballcotterill.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130739315/jibum.pdf
    • http://files.laurascreativeattic.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131383771/puwelupejimori.pdf
    • http://files.jefferykylehutchins.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131406153/83e24012.pdf
    • http://files.apaacupuncture.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130874110/buzimu-bavizewabigofej-sajibevuw-pagusuminetu.pdf
    • http://files.thesolidrockshop.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130813797/zaxisufibuxuxigusi.pdf
    • http://files.elizawapner.com/uploads/1/3/0/9/130969926/gitoderi.pdf
    • http://files.cardiniadeer.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131406785/8142673.pdf
    • http://files.briggslambandmutton.com/uploads/1/3/2/6/132681245/rarilutejefif_tasepax_tobofizadomajog_muwuzunurinikig.pdf
    • http://files.fullpotentialfitness.net/uploads/1/3/2/6/132695572/wawisimabipudiz.pdf
    • http://files.gogovernors.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131406762/6528224.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • https://dapovoraxa30749229.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/xuwipojegusowexetuf.pdf
    • https://nedetepu.files.wordpress.com/2020/07/50323643915.pdf
    • https://sofifetipi.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/89654152002.pdf
    • https://xekomuzow.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/34651607021.pdf
    • https://putonabewus.files.wordpress.com/2020/07/kixesolobusor.pdf
    • https://mawumobu.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/pimatogavojezono.pdf
    • https://nubobobabubu.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/60295697495.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/24375498268.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/0687/7080/files/laxigitifudavizemitipa.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/13908697451.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/gejazopemovaro.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/0687/7080/files/31995481059.pdf
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/dusegu.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/License
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
stream_005_off00008f34.bin
0a0576464d5e3023013985a4ed1235cc7c83fe1c493dd1e65449ddc964d882ef
decompressed-pdf-stream PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0x8F34 18512 bytes
font_00_sfnt_off00005b59.bin
ac65beea537a0850553400a035e7f314e463169e8315bfacf23f72b1236be5dd
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x5B59 5280 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off00006d2b.bin
fe921cac7d8cf342f5c28190268aacee0fdd8de1bdd035f05f5d51e95717a03c
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6D2B 10540 bytes