Malicious Office (OLE) / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 86fa1601eb20f50f…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .DOC

101.3 KB Created: 2007-09-18 04:34:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Word 11.
MD5: 2433077464e52f46642c30ccb1913eb8 SHA-1: 07ae6b75024c0eb7f8984b5c0d478eef1758cbdf SHA-256: 86fa1601eb20f50f3caf2a0077a824cb48b54c4a140457ca90ffc4037ca71df6
220 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 PowerShell T1059.003 Windows Command Shell T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample exhibits high-confidence heuristics indicating the use of WinExec, CreateProcess, and ShellExecute APIs, strongly suggesting an attempt to execute arbitrary code. The presence of XOR-encoded strings and a large slack space anomaly further supports malicious intent. The extracted path 'c:\winmsio.exe' is likely the dropped payload or a component of the execution chain.

Heuristics 5

  • XOR-encoded strings (key 0xCE) critical SC_XOR_ENCODED
    Found 5 Windows library/API name(s) XOR-encoded with single-byte key 0xCE: 'CreateProcessA', 'CreateFileA', 'OpenProcess', 'RegOpenKeyExA', 'ShellExecuteA'
  • Reference to WinExec API high SC_STR_WINEXEC
    Reference to WinExec API
  • Reference to CreateProcess API high SC_STR_CREATEPROCESS
    Reference to CreateProcess API
  • Reference to ShellExecute API high SC_STR_SHELLEXEC
    Reference to ShellExecute API
  • OLE document has large unaccounted-for region high OLE_SLACK_ANOMALY
    OLE file is 103,724 bytes but its declared streams total only 16,486 bytes — 87,238 bytes (84%) live in unallocated sector slack. This is the canonical hiding place for pre-macro-era Office exploit payloads (XOR-encoded shellcode reached via a parser pointer-corruption bug in the document structure).

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