RTF malware analysis — malicious · 86f91830fde978c2

MALICIOUS

RTF

28.4 KB First seen: 2023-05-30

MD5: d89bca5a30ab63889a8d2829dc6704a6 SHA-1: af517ddd61cdd6e3baf0a8dbc9be746f43dcaac1 SHA-256: 86f91830fde978c2a3fcf4c3b214a0f5eebcd563e72f760fd5f06104c8918c07

140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1204 User Execution T1204.002 User Execution: Malicious File

The RTF document contains an embedded OLE object with a split Equation Editor ProgID, indicating an attempt to exploit a known vulnerability. The \objupdate directive suggests that the object will be activated automatically or upon user interaction after enabling editing, as prompted by the document's lure. This points to a likely exploit delivery mechanism for a second-stage payload.

Heuristics 4

Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE

Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off000048af.bin` `c1d57ace84f00375d92a0c57ec0a3d5a367c6fe3d02c7c3a7e80af8a45ac6d9b`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x48AF	1346 bytes

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