Office (OLE) / .XLS malware analysis — malicious · 86e85674a2637575

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

445.0 KB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel First seen: 2023-08-03

MD5: 7fa3715bfad50eefef91bc1486972b6c SHA-1: d59eb73960dd601aeb3f4b3833e200c0c56bf297 SHA-256: 86e85674a2637575306cfcf4c3f8e6a847ee8c7cef270c57ea806fd01f20e9d5

132 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.005 Visual Basic T1059.001 PowerShell

The sample is an Excel file that exploits CVE-2017-0199 via an OLE2Link object to download a remote DOC file from http://103.37.60.77/iso/0001000002000030000040000500005%23%23%23%23%23%230000010112000000220001000002%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%230001202001205660000.DOC. The embedded PDF also contains suspicious findings, suggesting a multi-stage attack. No VBA macros were found to be executable, but the primary exploit is clear.

Heuristics 5

OLE2Link / URL Moniker → remote loader — CVE-2017-0199 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_0199

Document contains an embedded OLE link object whose URL Moniker points to a remote URL. When the host file is opened, Office follows the link, downloads the URL, and processes the response based on its Content-Type (HTA -> mshta.exe, RTF → Word, etc.) — the documented CVE-2017-0199 primitive. The URL extension is not a reliable filter; servers can return different payloads to Office's user agent.
Secondary embedded PDF body has suspicious static findings critical POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGE

A valid PDF body was found at a nonzero offset inside another container and its carved contents matched PDF exploit or lure heuristics. This catches polyglots where the top-level magic routes to ZIP/OLE while a PDF reader or downstream parser opens the hidden PDF payload.
VBA project contains no executable statements low OLE_VBA_MACROS

Document contains a VBA project, but extracted modules only contain attributes/options/comments and no executable statements.
Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL

The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL

One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.

URL http://103.37.60.77/iso/0001000002000030000040000500005%23%23%23%23%23%230000010112000000220001000002%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%230001202001205660000.DOC

Extracted artifacts 4

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`macros.bas` `7f506327609c082af1cd37dde23bc2c71a000f7d1ef530b6abb66775040a7673`	vba-macro	oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source)	1206 bytes
`stream_003_off00007760.bin` `2998a126f4fa11ceb265371a5f7968ec18bc4692a32631a544232dc74040021f`	decompressed-pdf-stream	PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0x7760	252488 bytes
`polyglot_child_pdf_off00000e00.pdf` `0c7c2999026bcb622460ef18a504819bd380086ba38b054f4305ae18f215962b`	polyglot-child-pdf	Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0xE00	452096 bytes
`polyglot_child_pdf_off00007c00.pdf` `60ce06600df22af2f609d0fdfbb7a2d607001a6de4b91ad52e7eb639cccd5253`	polyglot-child-pdf	Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x7C00	423936 bytes

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