Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLS — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 86dacb49b7dfb9ab…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

103.5 KB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel First seen: 2023-03-23
MD5: a46e6bf2b3e31bd2dc5c1e9aeb88444f SHA-1: f9ab8f67371464ea86e71919444066deb20aa140 SHA-256: 86dacb49b7dfb9ab14e0abc99153b7472090ab7104edb62539298bd3ad3d5a2f
70 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File Execution: Malicious File T1059.005 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Visual Basic

The sample is an Excel file that exploits CVE-2017-0199 via a URL moniker to download and execute a remote payload. The embedded URL points to a suspicious IP address and a file that appears to be a document, suggesting a downloader or initial access vector. No VBA code was found to be executable, but the exploit itself is the primary malicious functionality.

Heuristics 3

  • OLE2Link / URL Moniker → remote loader — CVE-2017-0199 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_0199
    Document contains an embedded OLE link object whose URL Moniker points to a remote URL. When the host file is opened, Office follows the link, downloads the URL, and processes the response based on its Content-Type (HTA -> mshta.exe, RTF → Word, etc.) — the documented CVE-2017-0199 primitive. The URL extension is not a reliable filter; servers can return different payloads to Office's user agent.
  • VBA project contains no executable statements low OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains a VBA project, but extracted modules only contain attributes/options/comments and no executable statements.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://kkkkkkkkkkkkk34kkkkkkkkkkkkkk34kkkkkkkkkkkkkk34kkkkkkkkkkkkkk34kkkkkkkkkkkk34kkkkkkkkkkkkkk34ksdfhdskfhsdkfh33hkh34h3k@192.3.243.151/38..............38.......doc

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
7f506327609c082af1cd37dde23bc2c71a000f7d1ef530b6abb66775040a7673
vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1206 bytes