Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 86c4bd54e8da604d…

MALICIOUS

PDF

39.0 KB Created: 2020-07-16 14:50:31 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2020-09-04
MD5: 3e94ab54df6f8a5a39858c321d91ce35 SHA-1: cd5917fa1c91d1659969c3f9a278ec85c693a10e SHA-256: 86c4bd54e8da604d8ad3f50bdb51d2ca129dcc1a5fa944819c7b7c249db251ea
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The PDF file contains a large number of embedded links, many of which point to disposable hosting and are likely part of a link farm. One critical heuristic identified a link to known malicious redirector infrastructure, suggesting the document is designed to lead users to malicious sites. The ML classifier also strongly indicated maliciousness.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.cc/wb?keyword=cplex%20python%20reference%20manual In PDF document text
    • http://files.susanwardbooks.com/uploads/1/3/1/6/131606670/fbfbbaf46c4.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.hazelsoper.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130775747/5386495.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.stokesdaleumc.org/uploads/1/3/2/6/132695325/cdb2df88.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.tattered-dragon.com/uploads/1/3/2/6/132682778/ae0fba8829.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://lipivova103284907.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/8535573687.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://sebonan.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/rezuxomu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://lixofejuj.files.wordpress.com/2020/07/nibusezaneni.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://jekaxiwu.files.wordpress.com/2020/07/faxurevibejig.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://nedepiru.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/kezanakinuxebapikaburas.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://natebiwogu.files.wordpress.com/2020/07/60410266165.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://mujesovo.files.wordpress.com/2020/07/52077467344.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://sipemuxi.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/97473182417.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://nakeset.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/97747532090.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://dipajar.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/84044902153.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0431/9969/2958/files/1135918153.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0430/4296/3613/files/88490257821.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/0687/7080/files/bovabokuvuxinapuwukiberem.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0430/8356/3162/files/98091167212.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/0687/7080/files/berujixawajibexuxutuzogar.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0429/7857/4490/files/bikirur.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00005b7d.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x5B7D 5104 bytes
SHA-256: a0f805132661262d679b4711dab71337e8833d99de962f883158c015fa30ae6a
font_01_sfnt_off00006cb8.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6CB8 9916 bytes
SHA-256: d63334a9296dbe68cd536fceab1bc71fb065341149efe408ca1e3f81a6b28f4c