Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 86c06644b4777770…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

1.79 MB
MD5: 62e81757c91e95b854fd4e45e78c5623 SHA-1: 1a7e2024e2ebe65adc80037c0ef2205bde418143 SHA-256: 86c06644b47777703101a6d8e81852435600ad193b72c2d44c2be067cbebb0f7
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF document contains multiple indicators of exploitation for CVE-2017-11882, specifically related to the Equation Editor. The presence of `RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR` and `CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED` heuristics strongly suggests that the embedded OLE object is designed to trigger this vulnerability. The `RTF_OBJUPDATE` heuristic further indicates that the object is intended to be activated, likely leading to arbitrary code execution.

Heuristics 5

  • Equation Editor activation — CVE-2017-11882 related high CVE related CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED
    RTF decodes to an Equation.3 ProgID and requests OLE activation with \objemb plus \objupdate. This reaches the legacy Equation Editor attack surface used by CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802 documents, but the malformed MTEF/native payload needed for stronger attribution was not recovered.
  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000011e1.bin
50bd7d0662fe0f42747cccbe4ee55d498ebb54f1d843b210e8fd7079b93bde97
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x11E1 61543 bytes
objdata_01_off00034d48.bin
4d6664f118eedff717160ab4a66190ef5c19c482cce6369b56962aafb643a777
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x34D48 453383 bytes