Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 86a98e2f9ee058e9…

MALICIOUS

PDF

41.9 KB Created: 2020-07-09 20:44:02 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2020-09-07
MD5: ec3fead884b6da2b603da32cdc4ffdb1 SHA-1: ff255bc55f29fe5c27a9e13eaa569dc15ebba6d5 SHA-256: 86a98e2f9ee058e9d2b9ef89b2206e09421846a3d2c1cab62340c2866bd27670
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains a deceptive lure related to 'Ncert solutions book pdf download' and hosts a large number of external links. Many of these links point to disposable domains and redirectors, indicating a link farm designed to distribute malicious content or phish users. The ML classifier strongly flagged this PDF as malicious, supporting the conclusion that it is part of a phishing or content distribution scheme.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 1.0000

Heuristics 5

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ttraff.ru/wb?keyword=ncert%20solutions%20book%20pdf%20download In PDF document text
    • http://files.orangehistory.org/uploads/1/3/1/3/131380998/6a7d3c8e67aa6.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.ps242q.org/uploads/1/3/1/4/131410094/21a61592.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.rioxpvista.com/uploads/1/3/1/6/131637034/36c763c9765.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.jeffgerber.ca/uploads/1/3/0/8/130873849/5024718.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.eosfp.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131379663/1753975.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.altcaresolution.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130775619/rivipokakikuve.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.petermrusso.org/uploads/1/3/1/4/131454692/nelosuzudewav.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.swpahro.com/uploads/1/3/2/6/132681625/dupuxevum.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://files.theflourishsisterhood.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131398156/95d18288fa830.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • https://zinetexis.files.wordpress.com/2020/07/bosebado.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xakovuwer.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/zununodonixofovevokotapep.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xajilaxaluv.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/memosasesugiwotubaxadosug.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0433/0687/7080/files/16485275060.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/mekokagowofulagifofid.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/nazowexoratusitufunu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0428/9835/8432/files/90442425312.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Related samples 8

Ranked by shared artifacts, heuristics, extracted URLs, CVEs, and signatures.

Full JSON: related samples API

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00006621.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6621 5296 bytes
SHA-256: f902f3bbe52436c3c3feecd829236eb0ccd429f80246e2201672b36ffc6e0230
font_01_sfnt_off0000783a.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x783A 10228 bytes
SHA-256: d2a33488ef861afcc1a4316b40fa93b03df3e2805522fa67a828217e32ceb3a8

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